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Take a Moment With Paul Grimwood

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Author’s Note: I am so proud and so pleased with this interview that I had the privilege of conducting with one of the storied international firefighters of our time. As you read Paul’s biography and his replies to my questions, there is no doubt to the volume of knowledge that my friend possesses.

So, pull up a chair, grab your favorite beverage and enjoy this unique learning experience. And when you are finished, drop Paul a line. He would love to hear from you. Thank you.

Biography

The biography of Paul Grimwood appears in his latest book ‘Euro FireFighter©’, published in 2008.

Paul Grimwood is a thirty-five year veteran of the British Fire Service, having served most of his time as firefighter in London Fire Brigade’s busy West End district. In the mid 1970s he also served an eighteen-month detachment into New York’s South Bronx 7th Division, during the busiest period in FDNY’s history. From 1976-77 he further served as a volunteer firefighter/EMT on Long Island’s south shore.

For more than thirty years Paul has been undertaking global research into structural firefighting strategy and tactics and has contributed in excess of 200 technical articles since 1979, in an effort to advance firefighter safety. During this time he has served and responded out of more 100 fire stations around the world, working alongside some of the finest firefighters you could ever wish to meet. He has also presented papers on fire service operations at international conferences in several countries since 1993.

His other books include ‘Fog Attack©’ (1992) and ‘3D Firefighting©’ (2005), the latter of which he joint authored with firefighting colleagues Battalion Chief Ed Hartin (USA), and Station Officers John McDonough and Shan Raffel (Australia).

From 1984 he served eleven years as a London Fire Brigade fire investigator and was part of the six-person team that investigated the tragic King’s Cross fire in 1987 where thirty-one lives were lost, including a colleague ( Station Officer Colin Townsley) from London’s Soho fire station.

He is a trained USAR instructor (EMT) and was deployed on operational disaster relief assignments into Iraq (1991) and Bosnia (1993). He is also a CFBT and tactical ventilation specialist (1984-2008) and a Tactical Deployment (command and control) and High-rise Firefighting instructor.

Paul is the founder and principal of Firetactics.com®, a website which has provided in excess of 14,000 pages of structural firefighting SOGs in six languages FREE to over 2.5 million visitors from more than seventy countries since July 1999 (source: Webstat.com).

He is an advisor to several UK Government Task Groups including ODPM Compartment Fire Behavior Training; BDAG High-rise Firefighting; CLG High-rise Firefighting, as well as an editorial reviewer for the Fire Safety Journal (the official journal of the International Association of Fire Safety Science). He is also an established ‘expert’ technical witness and advisor in fire service operations, having worked on several high-profile cases in the USA and Europe.

In 2008 Paul was awarded the Institute of Fire Engineers’ (IFE) highest academic status (FIFireE) in recognition of his thirty-year professional commitment to firefighter safety.

Update: Paul is now retired from Ops but working as a Fire Safety Engineer and High-rise Training Instructor for Kent Fire & Rescue in the UK, an active fire department of 66 fire stations that adjoins London Fire Brigade to the SE.

The Interview

CR: Paul; first of all, thank you very much for taking the time for this interview. You know; we still haven’t had that beer together yet?

PG: Art we have been friends for so many years and I can’t believe we haven’t had the opportunity to share that cold one together! Let it be soon!

CR: We all know when you started your career, but at what age did you start looking at a career in the fire service? What were your early influences?

PG: I wanted to be a firefighter from the age of fifteen. I hung around firehouses and made a nuisance of myself. I eventually got hired the day after my 18th birthday and became London’s youngest ever professional firefighter in 1971.

CR: Please name and describe some of your mentors.

PG: I saw good things in many role models through the 1970s. There were several fire chiefs in London of that era who I just have to mention, Roy Baldwin; Tony Wilmott and Tom Stanton who were legends in their time. In the USA I read everything FDNY’s Bill Clarke ever wrote as well as Frank Brannigan and who’s that guy … oh yeah Mittendorf in LA. There was also great advice coming from Leo Stapleton in Boston. I had the opportunity of spending an hour with Commissioner Stapleton in his office just before he went on the golf course, what a great guy.

CR: When you started in the fire service, what were the goals that you set for yourself?

PG: I wanted to be the best at what I did and I wanted to serve with the busiest. When I was initially assigned to London’s busiest of their 114 fire stations – Paddington – in London’s west end district I just couldn’t believe my luck. We picked up many serious working fires mainly in hotels during the early part of the 1970s. There were also streets full of vacants that became my learning ground as they burned on a nightly basis.

CR: Was it ever your plan that “student” would become “teacher”?

PG: No that was never my plan Art. I never even considered it, as I couldn’t imagine leaving station life. But then one day a 35 years veteran firefighter, Bill Willis, retired. His experience was going to be greatly missed when he got off the engine for the last time, I just didn’t know how we would cope. The things he told us about getting in and staying there weren’t written down anywhere. I though ‘ I just have to get this stuff down on paper for future generations of firefighters’. That became my first book – Fog Attack.

CR: You have worked for two of the most storied fire departments in the world.  Was FDNY just a “ride-along” that lasted almost two years or what? Why would you leave London, England for FDNY?

PG: You know I was very lucky. I met a guy in London in 1974 and we became great friends. Bill Bohner was a giant of a man and as the Deputy Chief in charge of the FDNY’s (then) 7th Division (South Bronx) he arranged a long-term detachment into New York City from London for me. I had to return to UK at the end of it but it had been an amazing experience to work with the bravest during the busiest period in their history. Yes I guess it was a ‘ride along’ because I was not qualified to wear a mask in the city but we still got in some pretty good scrapes! After all, the masks were nearly always left on the engine!

CR: Would you discuss the cultural differences (USA/Great Britain) not only in general terms, but also in terms of the fire service? Are the political issues that affect the fire service the same, similar or different?

PG: Cultural differences? Well in the UK we are sadly losing the tradition that stays with the job in the US, for example where there is often a strong family link in the fire service, sometimes through several generations of firefighters. I think it’s important that this tradition remains strong; I also think that US firefighters are way ahead on the moustache! This was a ‘must have’ here in the 1930s and some of the old time pictures hanging the walls of some fire stations in the UK show some real hairy droopers! We’ve lost that cultural identity! The political issues are exactly the same – cuts in public services are now an annual event and I just don’t know how much smaller our fire service can get! You can do a lot with a ‘little’ but the day comes when ‘little’ does a whole lot more to you!

 CR: Compartment Fire Behavior Training (CFBT) has come to define you. Can you describe how it evolved in theory and then into practice?

PG: It was the late 1970s and I had not long returned from the FDNY detachment, I was busy putting all the things I had learned in the US into published articles. ‘Smoke detectors in homes’; ‘Arson Task Forces’; ‘Medically trained First Responders on Engines’ and ‘Structural Venting tactics’ etc. Then I met some Swedish firefighters who told me about some stuff going on in Stockholm. It wasn’t until 1984 that I came to fully appreciate the strategy the Swedes termed ‘offensive firefighting’ where they were directing short sharp bursts of water-fog into the fire gases to get some ‘steam free’ cooling! I was fortunate enough to get on the nozzle at our next fire one night and guess what …. It was a stair-shaft fire …. Four floors alight and then more! We took the entire fire with a 40GPM flow-rate off of a booster line! Now let me tell you, the stair-shaft fire is the ideal scenario for such tactics because any super-hot water vapor just heads on upwards on the thermal draft and this takes out a whole lot more fire as it rises. I was sold on the Swedish tactics. We used this approach on ‘real’ fires many times over the next few years with some wins and a few losses. It was critical to realize the limitations of this method because if there was one thing the FDNY had taught me, it was to flow big water when it was really needed, or the fire was going to come back and get you. CFBT was a derivative of nozzle bursting tactics. You have the Swede Survival cans in the US but we developed the originals with the Swedes and believe me, it’s a very scientific training experience if these training tools are used correctly. You can learn a lot about fire behavior in these facilities (there is a range of simulators based on varied design principles) but you can also become over confident about ‘real’ fires – these are not ‘real’ fires but simply one-third scale fires that burn solely in the gas-phase. Lots of flaming combustion but no real fire base to hit. You need a good instructor to get the best out of these systems and in the US, Chief Ed Hartin is the best! (www.cfbt-us.com).

CR: Tell us how you developed and nurtured this “amalgamation” of the Swedish tactics of bursting water with anti-ventilation tactics versus your higher nozzle flow rates combined with tactical ventilation.

PG: Until the 1990s, venting structures was pretty alien to us! We would keep the fire area closed down inside our brick construction and go find it. As we developed our venting strategy we found we would get a better result by nozzle bursting the interior gases prior to creating openings. Now don’t think for one minute we were boiling trapped occupants or pushing fire around! This strategy demands precision that can only be learned on the live fire. The nozzle applications and fog patterns are carefully applied so as to remain in control of the thermal layering. As I said, sometimes the conditions are just too over-powering for this approach! I remember one fire we had on a Christmas day where black boiling smoke was emerging from all openings at ground level of a store with apartments above. We used two hose-lines from the street entrance doorways, nozzle bursting with alternate three-second hits into the smoke. It worked for us! We were patient and within four to five minutes we vented the windows and there was no backdraft. The fire was out pretty quick on this occasion.

CR: Your tactics weren’t embraced right away, were they? In fact; it took high profile firefighter deaths before you saw the change.

PG: It was tragic as it took three firefighter deaths in two days in February 1996 before the realization dawned that our firefighters knew very little about fire behavior and the hazards associated with ‘rapid fire’ phenomena. It was decided nationally, despite my twelve years of campaigning prior to these two tragedies, that the time had come to develop CFBT (live fire behavior training) for the UK’s 36,000 firefighters.

CR: Even then, CFBT wasn’t translating well to the fire-ground. What were the obstacles?

PG: There was no standard approach; the training objectives were inappropriate; and the training impact was totally missed! An opportunity went astray for several years as we failed to define the limitations of this approach. The concept of CFBT is to teach firefighters how a fire develops from an incipient fire to flashover. It is not a joy ride! It is not a means of teaching how every fire should be fought. It is very easy to become macho and over confident about the learning experience in these things (cans). You have to have a scientific head on to appreciate the learning objectives. You have to train with precision, controlling fire loading and venting parameters in order to give each student the same learning experience. It is not a real fire experience but believe me, it is as close as you need to get outside of the real thing.

CR: I’m sure that you have seen and probably discussed the “great debate”-fog vs. straight stream. What are you thoughts on that?

PG: Never has there been a more lively debate! For me there is no preference. I can extinguish a lot of fire using differing techniques with either a smoothbore or a fog nozzle. What I will say is that high water content in the stream is absolutely critical when the fire has spread beyond the compartment or room of origin!

CR: Paul; I can’t continue without offering you my platitudes for your book Euro FireFighter©. What was appealing to me was how you choreographed your steps towards incident CONTROL. Granted, the book almost overflows with an abundance of great information, but it all comes together as a perfect blueprint for fire officers in the end. How did you manage such a clear focus of what would become this book?

PG: Well thanks for those comments and that view Art. I always intended this book to be an instructor manual. I wanted the reader to take each and every bullet point and prompt debate from students. I found this a great way to develop learning and simply by taking a power-point and going through the bullet points as statements, we can all follow the debate with our own experiences. The incident command modules are logical processes based on the ‘error chains’ so often thrown up where tragedies occur.

CR: NIOSH. You used several reports in Euro FireFighter©. When you review them, are you looking for lessons learned and the critical information that might be a teachable moment down the road?

Does it concern you that we seem to repeat our mistakes in some cases? Do you think that it’s a fallacy that NIOSH uses templates, because their reports’ recommendations are very similar? I believe that they are similar because the incidents’ end results are very similar, as in repeating our mistakes. What say you?

PG: Any time we review reports of past fires we only get a small portion of what really happened. I know from several personal experiences that if you weren’t on the job yourself then any Monday morning quarterbacking is likely to be worthless. Or is it? The fact is that we are not there to criticize the actions of others but more so to immerse ourselves in the ‘error chain’, or any part of it even if we only get one or two links right, then we are right on the money! Wherever there is a fire where things went wrong it is usually the case that a chain of events unfolded, perhaps during the first five minutes following arrival on scene that set up irreversible circumstances leading to tragedy. In fact, we need to look for the point of ‘no return’ in each error chain and learn for ourselves that there IS in fact a point where we may reverse the situation and alter the outcome. Things happen fast and you may or may not be aware the chain is forming right there in front of you until it is too late. Its so important that fire commanders take a step back, take a breath and take it in. Pay close attention to what is occurring in front of you and don’t hesitate to take instant action that might save lives, even if it means pulling out.

Yes we are all guilty of repeating our mistakes. The thing is we get away with them for so long and they don’t take a bite out of us. It’s when we see several of these errors come together in a few short minutes. In each tragedy you will usually note 4-7 links in the chain that evolved early in the fire. I’ll tell you, the biggest omission from the NIOSH LODD reports is any information concerning fire behavior. We have spoke with them about this before but honestly, I just don’t think they understand fire behavior from a practical perspective and they miss obvious indicators and clear warning signs that might serve as good teaching points. Having said that, the NIOSH database of past reports serves as a critical learning tool. There are always things there to discuss, debate and learn from.

CR: At FDIC 2008, Lt. Ray McCormack delivered “the speech” heard around the world. You and I came out on our blogs with comments on his remarks. What did you get out of it?

PG: You know something? I really did get a feel for Ray’s message. I have to saagain that the way he came over was always going to draw responses in opposition from those of us who see the safety of firefighters as a priority. But he does have a point in some situations and I am seeing it more and more every day. In some areas we are going too far down ‘safety alley’. In my area we are given a directive to lay out three charged hose-lines on the upper floors of a high-rise before our firefighters can access the fire-involved area. Now for one thing that virtually writes off any chances of survival of remaining occupants. It also allows the fire to develop and grow bigger. No Ray, you had a good point and made it well in that your words reached out to millions! But you just have to take a step back and see the damage that might occur. You are a unique role model and some young firefighters will take your words as gospel. In the end, whichever side of the equation we originate from, we just need to meet in the middle and that’s all about getting the right balance between ‘risk versus gain’.

CR: You have a compatriot in the United States. Please tell us about Ed Hartin, since he had such nice things to say about you!

PG: Chief Ed Hartin is certainly one of the most outstanding firefighters I have ever met. His constant efforts to improve the education of firefighters and his unique ability to impart a message are typical of Ed’s mission in life. He continues to help firefighters in all parts of the world and I consider myself very fortunate to have met and worked with him because he has made me better at the things I try to do in life. Ed – thanks brother.

CR: Your website www.firetactics.com is extremely popular worldwide. Has it exceeded your expectations? How has technology driven and/or expanded your mission?

PG: You just have to love the worldwide web and yet we now take it for granted. In 1989 when I wrote my first book about international fire-fighting tactics (Fog Attack) I had to type every word without cut and paste. I did tear up a lot of paper! I also had to write to firefighters in several countries and you know, it took two to three weeks to get replies, just for me to write back to them again for more information! It was never ending.

When I managed to get Firetactics.com online I was blessed with a most generous offer from Task Force Tips to host it for me for free and they have done this ever since it first went online in July 1999. Its been a wonderful experience for me and before Firefighter Nation, Firehouse.com or Fire Engineering, ‘Firetactics’ was actually the most searched firefighting website on the web. It brought together firefighters from over 70 nations and I made many great friends through this route. The message was always about safety and firefighting innovations. I want to thank every single one of you who clicked on Firetactics.com in those early years because it told me that the world was full of firefighters that were looking for the very same answers as I was. I hope you found them.

CR: Can you talk about your charities?

PG: There have been many over the years. Lets just hope that some burn victims in the UK, USA and Australia have benefited somewhat from the proceeds. RAFT in the UK is my big one and thanks to the excellent first year sales of EuroFirefighter, the NYC Burns Foundation is about to get a nice check.

CR: Do you get any downtime? Any “Me” time, Paul?

PG: Sure! I love my family and we spend some great times together. But my weeks are getting more full with work as I get older!

CR: Please know that, in the world community known as the brotherhood/sisterhood, you are truly one of the brightest beacons that floods our senses with critical safety and survival techniques that will save our lives. What is next for the enterprise known as Paul Grimwood?

PG: Chief Art – it is you who shines as a beacon. If you only knew how your steadying influence and great words have spread out into the global firefighting brotherhood. You always know how to break things down to simple logic and speak to people in a firm but civil manner in a way that people really listen. I always say that when the going gets really rough Art will be there to take control. I would have loved to have served with you brother.

CR: When are we having that beer together?

PG: When those Yankees pick up the next World Series brother! Oh I’m sorry you’re a football fan!

CR: As is my custom, I always give my guest the last word along with my deep gratitude for their thoughts. Thank you so very much, Paul and you have the floor.

PG: This interview is a true honor for me so thanks Art. I want to thank everyone who has taken any interest in my work and who has taken the time to email me. It is truly gratifying to hear from firefighters how they think something I once wrote might have made their approach safer in a fire. Your personal friendships and lifelong dedication within the profession constantly inspires me to remain working well into my fourth decade. You are all very special people and it has been my great fortune to know you all.

I received an award when working in Malaysia from their Fire Commissioner. It is a lovely golden crested plaque with a red seal of authority. The words on the plaque are so true; it went like this;

‘We must learn to trust our men (and women) who fire fight in the front, they are closest to the dangers and the hazards, therefore that is where real wisdom is’.

The article as submitted is published under The Adventures of Jake and Vinnie© umbrella and is the intellectual property of Art Goodrich a.k.a. ChiefReason. It is protected by federal copyright laws and cannot be re-printed in any form without expressed permission from the author. You may read other works by the author at www.chiefreasonart.com. 

Trading Precious Resources for TIN!

3 comments

Having been involved in the fire service for almost 30 years, I have read and discussed firefighter deaths, as well as listen to many fire service intellectuals espouse their opinions on our fatality rate compared to other occupations, risk vs. gain, community expectations, etc.

What I have found is that there are TWO, distinctly separate camps, where it comes to what is “acceptable” and what is not. That is; there are those who believe that an average of 100 deaths a year isn’t bad, when you consider the “dangers” that we face and then there is the other side who believes that ONE is too many, if it could be prevented and that 100 deaths a year are UNACCEPTABLE.

Personally, I wish that we could put jealousies and egos aside and get crackin’ on a truly productive effort to bring down the line of duty deaths from firefighting activities. If you haven’t noticed, we are killing ourselves the majority of the time because, though being what we are and doing what we do beats strongly in our hearts, our hearts have been weakened by poor diet, lack of exercise and the stressors of the job, causing fatal heart attacks.

We are also killing ourselves going to and from the scene and killing others as well. Apparatus accidents and POV accidents are increasing at an alarming rate and we still have those that STILL refuse to buckle their seatbelt.

Approximately 20 percent of LODDs are the result of injuries incurred during actual fire suppression operations and this is the statistic that is favored by the first camp and that would be all well and good were it not for the issues that were involved in contributing/causing the death (s).

And when guys like me want to step back and look at the “big” picture in the hopes of peeling back the lessons learned/the takeaways, we are called “armchair and Monday morning quarterbacks, Safety Sallies, gutless, ball-less, embarrassment to the profession” and my favorite- “too safe”; just to name a few. I am well past getting upset about it anymore.

Firefighting is a risk-based business-we HAVE to take risks or we’re not doing our jobs.

Really?

Well then; we are going to look at a double LODD from West Virginia and then you tell me if you still feel that we should trade our firefighters-our precious resources-for a tin can.

In Grimwood’s book Euro Firefighter©, Paul describes the “error chain”. In the error chain, Grimwood states:

The ‘error chain’ is a concept that describes human error accidents as the results of a sequence of events that culminates in death or serious injury. Typically, there is usually a chain of mistakes, or omissions, inactions, or failings, that all contribute to the final outcome…

Familiarizing firefighters with the concept of recognizing and eliminating the error chain can prevent an accident before it can occur…

There are some critical clues to identifying links in the error chain. They are divided into: Operational factors and Human Behavior factors…

The presence of any one factor (or more) does not mean that an accident will occur. Rather, it indicates rising risk levels in field operations and that firefighters and fire officers must maintain control through effective management of both risk and resources, in order to eliminate unsafe acts, unsafe conditions and unsafe behavior.

On Thursday, February 19, 2009, Craigsville-Beaver-Cottle Fire Department in Nicholas County, West Virginia lost Lt. Johnnie Howard Hammons and FF Timothy Allen Nicholas during fire suppressions operations. Both were experienced firefighters, according to records ( http://www.register-herald.com/archivesearch/local_story_051234439.html ).

According to the NIOSH report ( http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200907.html ), Victim #1 (Hammons) and Victim #2 (Nicholas) entered the front door of the mobile home trailer with a charged 1-1/2 inch hose line. Within 5 to 10 minutes of them entering, the pump operator sounded the evacuation alarm when he noticed that his tank water was low. The victims did not evacuate from the structure. Firefighters on scene attempted to contact them via radio and by yelling into the mobile home. The fire chief and a firefighter tugged on the hoseline several times with no response. They then pulled on the hoseline and it came freely from the mobile home. Both victims were found in the front room, several feet from the front door.*

*Names of victims were added by author. Names of victims are not contained in NIOSH reports.

Using Grimwood’s template for the ‘error chain’, we will dissect the investigation report of NIOSH.

Text from the NIOSH report will appear in italics.

From the NIOSH Summary:

Their facepieces were not on when they were found…

According to the medical examiner’s office, the victims died from smoke inhalation and thermal inhalation. The carboxyhemoglobin (carbon monoxide poisoning) levels were 63% in Victim #1 and 64% in Victim #2. The toxicology reports for both victims showed lethal doses of cyanide in their systems.

It is hypothesized that based on injuries, positions of the bodies when found and the condition in which the victims were found leads investigators to believe that the victims did not enter the structure on air. Masks were found hanging unattached to either victims’ face. Entering into an IDLH atmosphere without proper PPE greatly compromises the safety of entrants. Obvious are the breach in the Human Behavior factors in the ‘error chain’; however, several Operational factors were present, including but not limited to:

- Lack of SCBA maintenance program.

- SCBAs not equipped with PASS alarms.

- Incident Command directly involved with fire ground activities.

- Wind conditions pushing smoke though the mobile home (horizontal chimney effect).

- Anchor for strap on SCBA mask missing, compromising a positive seal.

- No radio carried by interior crew.

- Incident Commander did not take command by naming incident, designating command post and did not give initial report on conditions.

- Incident Commander was initially helping with traffic control, pulling electrical meter and helping with pump operations.

By performing these tasks, the Incident Commander lost control of initial firefighting activities of the victims, firefighting activities of other fire suppression teams and the search and rescue of firefighters.

In addition, changing fire conditions were not monitored or communicated and fire suppression efforts were not coordinated.

A Personal Accountability Report (PAR) is essential to an accountability system. It was known that two firefighters were missing, but their names were unknown at the scene. A call back to the fire station had to be made to determine the names of the missing.

Furthermore, no Incident Safety Officer (ISO) was established to assist the Incident Commander with accountability, firefighter safety or ensuring the donning of PPE.

Would a properly trained ISO have allowed entry into the structure at all and if so, without firefighters being properly attired in PPE, including SCBA and on air?

No Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) was staged and prepared to respond to a firefighter emergency. No one trained in RIT was on scene that day, so the Incident Commander chose them based on experience once he realized that he had a firefighter emergency.

Mobile homes are unlike common residential homes in that they act as a horizontal chimney, because of their narrow width with narrow hallways. It was reported that a hose team using a 2-1/2 inch diameter hose was working at the opposite end of the trailer from the victims. Once inside, they switched from straight stream to fog, changing the thermal balance by introducing more air flow due to the nozzle setting. As the rescue team on the A-side of the trailer was conducting their search for the victims, they reported very hot, smoky conditions from the D-side, where the other hose team was operating. The D-side team only stopped when they ran low on air and exited the structure, taking their hose to the A-side. The Incident Commander took the hose on fog and aimed it through the front door, immediately dissipating the smoke and heat and allowing the rescue team to find the victims.

The department Standard Operating Guidelines (SOGs) were “out-dated” and were in the process of being updated. It was noted by investigators that the SOGs were mostly administrative in nature and lacked detailed fire ground operations.

Both victims had their Nomex® hoods rolled down on their necks. Victim #1’s helmet was found on the couch…as if it had been taken off and laid there. Both victims’ facepieces were found hanging at waist level with their regulators attached, possibly indicating that they were stored in this manner.

It was noted that the department was using both low pressure tanks and high pressure tanks. Some had integrated PASS alarms, some had stand-alone PASS devices and some without any PASS device. Soot was found inside and outside of the facepieces of the victims; another indication that the facepieces were not being worn by the victims.

Facepieces had not been flow tested since March of 2002. Investigators also determined that SCBA bottles had not been recently hydro-statically tested.

Firefighters did not have personal facepieces, but instead, shared them. Questions of proper fit-testing procedures and medical evaluations for respirators were raised. It was noted that many fire department members, including Victim #1 had excessive facial hair and beards.

During the initial phases of the incident, E32 could not pump water, because the truck was in the wrong gear. It was corrected by the Incident Commander and water was then available from E32.

Wind conditions at the time of the call were steady at 15 miles per hour with gusts up to 24 miles per hour. It was reported that weather conditions were not properly considered when employing fire suppression operations.

The structure’s integrity after having been under heavy fire load contributed to a firefighter falling through the floor during interior fire suppression operations. Fortunately, he continued to spray water and was successfully extricated without injury.

This is a very tragic incident that cost two men their lives and their families will be without them forever more.

The problems with the investigative materials that come out after we have laid fallen firefighters to rest is that they are not lauded for their critical review of the available evidence, but instead are seen as criticisms.

When we look at what leads to or contributes to the deaths of our brothers and sisters, we have to set aside our emotions, maintain an open mind, fully digest and process the information so that we can learn from it.

In this case, we have to understand that fighting fires in mobile homes presents unusual challenges and cannot be treated with the same tactics employed at a wood framed, light-weight constructed residence. If you don’t remember anything else, remember “horizontal chimney”.

And to firmly grasp the concept and the evolution of the “error chain” as defined by Grimwood, I recommend that you read this NIOSH report.

If you find any similarities to your department, I strongly urge you to change it NOW. We owe it to Lt. Johnnie Howard Hammons and Firefighter Timothy Allen Nicholas.

If we don’t change it now, we will continue to trade firefighters-precious resources-for tin.

TCSS.

The article as submitted is published under The Adventures of Jake and Vinnie© umbrella and is the intellectual property of Art Goodrich a.k.a. ChiefReason. It is protected by federal copyright laws and cannot be re-printed in any form without expressed permission from the author. You may read other works by the author at www.chiefreasonart.com.