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Most Influential LODD Report-Submission for Blog Carnival

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We should take something from every LODD report that we read.

We should take the time to read them, if for no other reason than to honor the fallen firefighter(s) and their families.

Over the years, I have read several LODD reports that have had a profound influence, but there is one that affected me more deeply than the others and changed ME with regards to how we should conduct ourselves in a leadership role, remind us how important safety is while conducting our business, to train our departments to recognized standards and to NEVER use the term “volunteer” as an excuse to be less than professional.

The LODD of Bradley Golden was one of the most tragic examples of the stigma that is carried by the volunteer fire service with regards to officer qualifications, leadership skills, training and standards/compliance.

In short; Bradley Golden’s Line-of-Duty-Death was the result of colossal failures from the top down and affects me so deeply because it was so preventable.

According to the NIOSH LODD report http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200138.html, on September 25, 2001, Firefighter Bradley Golden of the Lairdsville, NY Fire Department died from asphyxia due to smoke inhalation during a live-burn training exercise. Firefighter Bradley Golden was just 19 years old and had been a member of the department for THREE weeks!

In addition, Adam Croman and Benjamin Morris were seriously injured during the same training exercise.

For a complete story that goes well beyond the NIOSH LODD report, go to http://chiefreasonart.com/brads-page/ .

On October 31, 2002, the final “Death in the Line of Duty” report was published by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200138.html.

The following recommendations were made:

1)       Fire departments should ensure that no one plays the role of victim inside the structure during live-burn training. (NFPA 1403, 2-4.13)

2)       Fire departments should ensure that a certified instructor is in charge of the live-burn training and that a separate safety officer is appointed and has the authority to intervene and control any aspect of the operation. (NFPA 1403, NFPA 1041)

3)       Fire departments should ensure that only one training fire is ignited at a time by a designated ignition officer and that a charged hose line is present while igniting the fire.

4)       Fire departments should ensure that Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are developed and followed.

5)       Fire departments should ensure that all firefighters participating in live-burn training have achieved a minimum level of basic training. (NFPA 1403, 2-1.2)

6)       Fire departments should ensure that before conducting live-burn training, a pre-burn briefing session is conducted and an evacuation plan and signal are established for all participants.

7)       Fire departments should ensure that fires used for live-burn training are not located in any designated exit paths.

8)       Fire departments should ensure that the fuels used in the live-burn training have known burning characteristics and the structure is inspected for possible environmental hazards. (NFPA 1403, 2-2.10)

9)       States should develop a permitting procedure for live-burn training to be conducted at acquired structures. States should ensure that all requirements of NFPA 1403 have been met before issuing the permit.

As I said, the LODD report does not tell the whole story. See http://chiefreasonart.com/brads-page/.

In the aftermath of Bradley’s tragic death, Assistant Chief Alan Baird III was convicted of criminally negligent homicide. The parents of Bradley Golden filed a lawsuit against the fire department.

On July 17, 2003, “Bradley’s Law” was signed by NY Governor George Pataki. The law makes it illegal for people to pose as victims during live-burn training.

And I will always remember Firefighter Bradley Golden, tragically killed while in the prime of his youth by those sworn to protect him.

TCSS.

Ever-Changing is Always Confusing!

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It started with that very first, “If you don’t like the rules, then don’t play”!

But then, someone came along who decided, “Well, I don’t like the rules, but I want to play, so we’ll change the rules”.

And so it began.

When more and more got to play and it was starting to get crowded, then the rules were tightened, so that fewer got to play.

But, that appeared to be discriminatory, so the rules were changed again in the name of diversity.

But, when diversity proved to be discrimination in reverse, the rules were changed once again.

And on and on.

How does it happen that these changes are made?

How is it that rules, requirements, legislation or laws are so ill-conceived that they face these barrages of changes?

In my opinion, it is because the INTENT is often misinterpreted.

What seemed like a good idea at the time, turned out to be a sieve for challenges by anyone smart enough to ask the question. And rather than stay with the original intent; the intent became the victim of more liberal interpretations, because our society has moved more towards inclusion, so as not to appear exclusionary and done so without consideration for cost or the problems created by constantly changing the rules.

I offer as examples federal grant programs, PSOBs and my favorite; NIMS.

The “don’t haves” complain that the rules are too stringent that they can’t comply, whether it be a training standard or a grant for training.

The “haves” complain that what they get isn’t enough or doesn’t go far enough.

Both are appeased when rules are “loosened” for the “don’t haves” and the “haves” get to apply for money in more than one category. On the surface, it looks like “win-win”, but it isn’t, because, unless you walk up and hand someone a bundle of cash, there will always be the “don’t haves”.

I have seen a couple of recent articles that address public pensions (http://www.iacoj.com/modules.php?name=Forums&file=viewtopic&t=12453&highlight=) and LODDs (http://backstepfirefighter.com/2010/04/15/case-for-the-asterisk/).

With public pensions and with firefighters pensions to be more precise, it appears that the public-i.e. taxpayers-aren’t as supportive of the notion that firefighters are worth their pensions.

Yeah; all of a sudden and in these tough economic times, the citizenry has the same contempt for ALL public sector employees, regardless of job description. It would appear that our once-adoring public HAS put a price on public safety and it’s less than they are currently paying.

It seems that governments everywhere have no desire to eliminate wasteful spending in order to continue to deliver needed services, if it means eliminating their relatives and their pet pork projects. They want to max out credit and borrow more and if they can’t, they will cut where it hurts the most.

But, taxpayers all across the nation are saying “enough is enough”.

And I’m saying that, once again, our societal tendencies have shown that, when we are angry, we will indeed cut off the nose to spite the face!

Turning to LODDs, the language in this document continues to be a “work in progress”, though I’m not sure how much progress is being made. I believe that we have gone past reasonableness if we award LODD status to firefighters who die in a car wreck while returning from training; a car wreck that may have been caused by street racing. Note that I use “IF” and “MAY” and I will also throw in that, until the alleged charges are proven, judgment should be withheld on guilt AND the awarding-or not-of LODD status.

My opinion will be very clear on this; without using the news article from North Carolina as an example, I will simply say that firefighters who are returning from a sanctioned event and are involved in an incident where they have violated rules of conduct or laws and die as a result, then LODD status should not be awarded. Death benefits and type of funeral service will to be determined as well.

My opinion in general on LODD is this: maybe it’s time that we return to the days when you were actually engaged at an incident in an activity and died at the time you were engaged in said activities. Illness due to the many pulmonary, cardiac and cancers that cause death have their place under LODD, if for no other reasons, the illness occurred from their occupation.

I mean; it has gotten to the point where, if you die of complications from an abscessed tooth and was seen eating candy bars at the fire station, you get LODD status.

We have lost sight of the INTENT, which are noble and political correctness has weighed heavily on the LODD process and created an “LODD Lite” category. I feel that, if you have to split hairs, then it shouldn’t qualify. If you don’t look at the total package and only the information that meets the criteria, then we will see a day when a firefighter arsonist who set the fire and died while putting it out, will be on the memorial.

My point is that, if there are “questions” surrounding the death, then maybe we should hold off on the “honors” until we are certain that it will not bring major embarrassment to the department.

Unless we don’t care; you know; just like our elected officials.

No thanks.

Let’s talk about it at FDIC in Indy.

TCSS.

The article is protected by federal copyright law under The Adventures of Jake and Vinnie© umbrella. It is written and submitted by Art Goodrich a.k.a. ChiefReason. This article or any other article submitted under The Adventures of Jake and Vinnie© umbrella cannot be reproduced in ANY form without the expressed, written permission of the author. Violations are punishable by applicable laws.

Please visit: www.fireemsblogs.com and my blog www.chiefreasonart.com.

Colorado – Engine Rollover LODD NIOSH Final Report

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The website article can be read here: http://www.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/niosh-investigation-report-26

I just finished reading the NIOSH report on the February 23, 2008 apparatus rollover that took the life of 33 year-old Shane Stewart of the Ault-Pierce, Colorado Fire Protection District. The NIOSH report can be read here: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200805.html.

The report states that Captain Shane Stewart died after being ejected from the cab and was then rolled over by the apparatus. He was declared dead from multiple traumatic injuries at the scene.

Though it is true that the failure to wear the seat belt was front and center stage in this report, it also raised an issue that I had not seen or even considered before I read this report. There was an issue with the cab compartment “layout”.

It appears that the driver of this unit could NOT reach the mobile radio unit from the drivers’ seat with the seatbelt on! If this were common knowledge, then the experienced driver might not bother to put the seatbelt on at all and the less experienced might attempt to unbelt while enroot to the scene, if he wanted to talk on the unit’s mobile radio. (It should be noted that investigators conducted several tests, using several different drivers to reach these conclusions.)

When going to an incident scene, an apparatus driver should just drive; right?

The second person in the cab should be operating the radio; right?

How many departments have ever called back to the station to request another rig, knowing that it would come with just a driver, even though your SOP may state “a minimum of two per unit” or whatever that minimum is?

A straight stretch of road in good weather conditions and travelling at approximately 45 mph in a tanker is NOT a recipe for an accident.

In this incident, it appears that things went terribly wrong when the driver attempted to reach towards the radio to change to the fire ground frequency.  Even with a hands-free system, changing channels would require the radio operator to reach.

So, the location of the mobile radio in the cab becomes very important.

Anything that distracts the driver from his primary duty of driving is cause for concern, but, as the sole occupant as in this case, you still need to communicate.

Could the driver have used Dispatch as a relay to the fire ground, which, in this case, was a medical call requesting a landing zone set up for a med-evac helicopter, instead of attempting to change channels while enroot?

I don’t have the answer for that.

Could the driver have used a portable radio with lapel mike instead of the mobile radio? I don’t know what type of radio system they have, so I can’t answer it.

Does driving and shifting gears with a floor-mounted shifter create a distraction that is different than driving and changing channels or even talking on a radio? The report would lead us to believe that a second person in the cab should handle all non-driving tasks.

So, if some believe that a driver should keep both hands on the steering wheels at all times, then all trucks will have to be built with automatic transmissions.

Would a hard-fast SOP that requires two persons minimum per rig be a solution? I would have to say “yes”, because, if you have a driver who is driving AND shifting gears; then add to that, the radio tasks, then I believe that the drivers’ focus would be diminished.

Would you locate the radio in closer proximity to the driver? Would you have it done professionally or would you do it yourselves to save money? Are you aware that even though you do the work that you must still be in compliance with NFPA 1901?

Would you consider hands-free, voice activated headsets with a radio frequency protocol that allows for apparatus drivers to communicate without switching channels while driving?

My final point is that we have to make sure that apparatus drivers are trained and tested at least twice a year in the apparatus that they will be expected to operate and done in accordance with NFPA 1002, 1451, 1500 and 1901.

The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration exempts the occupants of fire trucks and rescue vehicles from wearing seatbelts when moving and I believe that this goes back to the days when we could ride on the tailboards and in open cabs, so that law needs changed so that it parallels the many initiatives by our national organizations to get everyone to buckle up.

Everyone who spoke of Captain Shane Stewart said that he wore his seatbelt religiously. See news article here: http://www.greeleytribune.com/article/20080223/NEWS/866066115.

He left behind a wife and two small children.

Let’s honor him and his family by learning from him.

TCSS.

This article is protected by federal copyright laws and cannot be reproduced in any form without the expressed permission of the author or his legal representative.

Please visit: www.fireemsblogs.com and my blog at: www.chiefreasonart.com.

HCN Is NOT A Cable TV Channel!

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February is American Heart Month.

That’s it; one month and the shortest one at that?

How can we expect to maintain a sustained effort to reduce heart-related deaths in the fire service if we only pull out the PR campaign once a year?

Besides; we will forget about it as quickly as we forget all of those New Years’ resolutions. You know the ones; going to lose weight, eat healthier, exercise more and trim your nose hair more often.

Doing what I just mentioned is taking some personal responsibility in our battle to reduce LODD heart attacks, but what about some of the triggers that come from outside the body; something like hydrogen cyanide (HCN)?

You should know that HCN is peeking over the shoulder of carbon monoxide (CO) at your structural fires.

Think about it; how many times have you read a post-mortem on a firefighter that says, “Recent physical found patient to be in good condition; no family history of heart disease; death from sudden cardiac arrest”?

If I was a betting man and I am, I would bet that hydrogen cyanide (HCN) got to him while he was inside doing salvage and over-haul and at a time when many of you will shed your SCBAs.

Why would we suspect hydrogen cyanide (HCN)?

For one thing, it’s a sneaky bastard.

It is colorless; it doesn’t always give off an odor and is released when products such as wool, silk, cotton, nylon, plastic, polymers, foam, melamine, polyacrylonitriles and synthetic rubber burns.

So, that “smoke” that you smell most likely contains hydrogen cyanide (HCN).

Plus, hydrogen cyanide (HCN) likes to hang out in enclosed areas. It dissipates very quickly outdoors, but inside, it is less dense than air and will rise, but will remain trapped in rooms.

As you breathe it, it will prevent the cells in the body from using oxygen, killing the cells. Since our heart and our brain use more oxygen than the other organs, they will be more greatly affected. It could cause the brain to become confused and send mixed signals to the heart, causing arrhythmia.

Other signs and symptoms of HCN exposure that should not be ignored are rapid breathing, restlessness, dizziness, weakness, headache, nausea/vomiting and rapid heart rate could give way to convulsions, low blood pressure, slow heart rate, loss of consciousness, lung injury and respiratory failure leading to death.

And were it not for the fact that you are a firefighter, these symptoms might be explained by some other medical reasoning.

And let’s be honest; some of the symptoms that I have described have been experienced by many of us at a fire scene, but ignored, because we figured it was from adrenaline, possibly smokeless tobacco or physical exertion. THAT is why we need to go to rehab and THEY have to be familiar with HCN exposure.

If you don’t think that this gas-a gas that is 35 times more toxic than carbon monoxide (CO)-can kill you, then why was it used in Nazi death camps during World War II?

Yeah; I know THAT got your attention!

Here is the most insidious characteristic of hydrogen cyanide (HCN): you may not suffer any short term effects at the time of exposure, but may develop symptoms after two or three weeks. This leads to the LODD question and the linkage to death due quite possibly to HCN exposure and whether it qualifies.

How many of you have gas detectors that test for hydrogen cyanide (HCN)?

How many of you wear full turnout gear, including SCBAs during ALL interior operations and until they are concluded? Dumpster fires? Vehicle fires? You’d better think about it.

How many departments have a rehab unit that is trained in HCN exposure recognition?

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has several articles on hydrogen cyanide (HCN) that are worth your time to read.

One of the best articles out there right now is an article by Richard Rochford entitled “Hydrogen Cyanide: New Concerns for Firefighting”. It is a must read.

Then, click on www.firesmoke.org. Shawn Longerich would love to hear from you.

By recognizing and respecting the dangers of hydrogen cyanide, we may save more lives, including our own.

Being a “smoke eater” is no longer a badge of honor.

TCSS.

Sources:

Hydrogen Cyanide: New Concerns for Firefighting by Richard Rochford

Facts About Cyanide – Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

February is American Heart Month – Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

The article is protected by federal copyright law under The Adventures of Jake and Vinnie© umbrella. It is written and submitted by Art Goodrich a.k.a. ChiefReason. This article or any other article submitted under The Adventures of Jake and Vinnie© umbrella cannot be reproduced in ANY form without the expressed, written permission of the author. Violations are punishable by applicable laws.

Please visit: www.chiefreasonart.com

The Tradition Expedition

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In between my writing of blogs and participating in discussion threads, I read some of the other blogs.

I have my favorites and for the most part, I will keep you guessing, because I don’t want to influence the voting for the 2009 Best Blog of the Year (http://firecritic.com/2010/01/fireems-blog-of-the-year-2009-finalists-and-voting/).

However; I think that I have read almost every article written by Jason Zigmont of VolunteerFD.org. No; it isn’t a plug. In fact, I may have just cursed him. Sorry, Jason.

Jason’s recent article, “The Traditions That Hold Us Back” (http://www.volunteerfd.org/article/737135/) couldn’t be timelier.

I had just finished a blog on “tradition”, read Jason’s blog; then wadded mine up and threw it away, because he caused me to look at the subject of tradition once again.

To me, which is to say that it is my opinion that Jason writes with a style that is not layered to the point that you miss the point! His article, as usual, makes excellent key points.

Now; for my thoughts on the subject of “tradition”.

I don’t believe that a revolution to kill traditions is taking place in the fire service. Instead, I believe that there is an evolution of our fire services’ traditionalism that will define it for generations to come.

The oldest of traditions-that of generations of families sending their members into the proud service of their fellow Man as firefighters-will continue unencumbered.

However; another old tradition involving generations of families that will end up on the endangered species list is the practice of nepotism. Many of us can work with our relatives without enlisting them for some sinister scheme to control our workplace.

But, nepotism almost guarantees that anything bad that can happen WILL happen. I have no problems with a father/son combo, where no special treatment is imagined or real. My problem is with families who seize control of a fire department, plunders it for their personal gain and then leaves it on life support.

Yes; that is a tradition that we can do without and communities that allows it, are ignorant of it or don’t care about it, perpetuates the tradition. Firefighters AND communities must change it.

Another tradition that I hope to see less of are the LODD funerals. I am speaking to the NUMBER of funerals. Traditionally, no less than 100 LODD funerals a year are conducted in this country and countless more firefighter funerals of brothers and sisters taken by illness, disease and old age.

With that said, we must preserve the sanctity and solemn ceremony to pay our proper respects to our fallen brothers and sisters. It is a tradition that must never erode, fade or disappear.

We should not allow tradition that will constrain our thirst for new technologies, tactics or services to our communities.

We should do what we can to change the tradition that says that we can do more with less (See LODD funerals). We are at a point of diminishing returns and a new tradition of closing stations, reducing manpower and having rotating brown outs are taking hold (See LODD funerals). The veterans who have served on properly staffed and properly funded departments must remain engaged in the fight to get their resources restored and put the next generation on solid footing or we risk donning the Class A’s for more funerals.

We must preserve the tradition of firehouse cooking, but we need to eliminate high salt, high sugar and high fat meals. Healthy diets and healthy lifestyles will help battle the growing cardiac episodes and cancer rates in our fire service.

The firehouse, kitchen table discussions is a tradition that has not only continued, but has flourished by expanding to Internet website discussion boards (http://www.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/tradition-honor-this-is-for?commentId=889755%3AComment%3A4445098&xg_source=msg_com_forum).

Heated topics with heated debates cools quickly when the tones drop at the firehouse, but they  don’t cool as quickly on a website. Some will promote respectful debate while others will promote what could be akin to UFC matches. Hopefully, in the end, participants will invoke the tradition of handshakes from one brother to another.

The last tradition that I will touch upon is the tradition of driving fast to the incident-too fast to be more accurate. We must drive with due regard, with a sense of urgency and always with the safety of our firefighters and our citizens in mind. And wearing our seatbelts is a no brainer.

So; what is our finest tradition?

I believe that it is teaching, learning, making a difference and then going home to our loved ones.

We must always remember that the future of our fire service won’t be determined by the ones leaving, but the ones who are taking their places and we must give them every opportunity to succeed.

That will insure that their department and our fire service will also succeed.

In the meantime, we have to figure out which traditions to keep and which ones to write into the history books.

For more on the subject, see Tiger: http://tigerschmittendorf.com/

http://runtothecurb.wordpress.com/.

TCSS.

The article is protected by federal copyright law under The Adventures of Jake and Vinnie© umbrella. It is written and submitted by Art Goodrich a.k.a. ChiefReason. This article or any other article submitted under The Adventures of Jake and Vinnie© umbrella cannot be reproduced in ANY form without the expressed, written permission of the author. Violations are punishable by applicable laws.

Please visit: www.chiefreasonart.com

When the Dream Turns to Nightmare

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This blog was prompted by the most recent death of an FDNY firefighter and though, there is clear linkage to his presence at the WTC on 9/11, he was not accorded LODD status.

http://www.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/fdny-denies-line-of-duty

It is in a firefighter’s nature to learn with an almost child-like enthusiasm and then to execute with the ferocity of a wild animal. Obstacles don’t exist in our world. Problems are quickly solved. Emergencies are mitigated with precision and professionalism. The only fear is the fear of failure.

For many, the dream started generations ago. Their father, grandfather and great-grandfather served with honor and in the fire services’ highest tradition. The dream came out of the stories that were told and re-told and yes; sometimes embellished. There were stories about gearing up in the cab of the truck, feeling the adrenaline overtake you, the biggest fire, the hottest fire, most unusual fire, harrowing rescues, crawling down smoke-filled hallways, running up several flights of stairs to get above the fire floor, dropping to your bellies as the fire rolls over you like a freight train, holding the knob and directing the water onto the fire, forcing a door, pulling a ceiling looking for fire extension, cutting a vent, taking windows, making a grab and on and on.

Those stories and hanging out at a fire station would pave that road to the dream.

Shift by shift, day in and day out, year after year, firefighters have lived the dream. Many could talk about their close calls, what each incident had taught them, what was successful and not so successful, the many friendships that they had made, the unbreakable bonds to their brother and sister firefighters, the strength of their call to duty and the clarity of their mission. It was all fuel for the dream.

While working at the best job in the world, thoughts were turning to yet, another dream; the dream of retiring to a good pension and the reunions with fellow retirees. Sleep would only be interrupted by a need to urinate or by the occasional barking dog. Every day would be a Kelly day. Family would become the focus after years of playing second fiddle to the job. Your hobby would become a reality as you worked from boxes upon boxes of memories that would become several scrapbooks, dedicated to the many years of your dedication.

And as you come to an end of one dream to start another, you notice that a sore throat hasn’t resolved after several weeks of ignoring it. You see that cut on your shin isn’t healing. Maybe you are experiencing low back pain or a pain in your kidneys for no apparent reason.

Or, you are feeling fine, but you go for a routine check up, only to discover that the doctor wants to order more tests as a precaution. It could be that the colonoscopy showed something; perhaps a polyp. There is a spot on a lung or at least an unusual mass that requires further review. It could be that your urine is darker than normal. Perhaps your white blood cell count is low and you have no history of leukemia in your family.

You go home, thinking about your next shift. It may be time to pay back C shift for changing the padlock on your food locker. There’s new construction going on and it would be a good time to see the building without its skin. It would go nicely with the upcoming building construction class being taught. There’s a new recruit class due to graduate, so lots of activities will be planned to transition the probies into their crews.

The next week goes by pretty unremarkably and then the phone rings. The doctor wants to see you today. The test results are back. No; he doesn’t like to discuss test results over the phone.

You arrive at the office and check in with the desk. You thumb through a two month old People magazine, but it’s just something to do. You aren’t reading or even looking at the photos. You want to get the news; good or bad.

After a 30 minute wait, you are taken to an exam room and told that “Doctor will be with you shortly”. You remember that cell phones are to be turned off while in the doctor’s office, so you grab it and turn it off. You stare at the poster of the human anatomy, realizing that you weren’t too well schooled on the names of certain muscles, joints or bones. You study it as if you will be tested on it. Then the doctor comes in.

He shakes your hand and without so much as an obligatory salutation, he tells you that you have a cancer.

Your dream has just turned into a nightmare.

The doctor is mapping a strategy that you’re not sure is going to kill the disease before it kills you. You discuss it in general, yet optimistic terms. Maybe it’s a cancer that, if caught early, will provide you with a 95% survival chance.

Or, you have one of the more insidious of cancers; pancreatic. Pancreatic cancer, in its early stages, will not illicit noticeable symptoms. By the time you become symptomatic, you have a 10% chance of beating it. That is a nightmare from Hell!

And though you are surrounded by family, friends and fellow firefighters who have sworn to be at your side every step of the way, you are alone with your deep despair and feelings of betrayal towards your God and a profession that you literally have given your life to.

You could almost tolerate the nightmare were it to end with an LODD funeral and benefits paid to your widow.

But, due to faulty logic, bureaucracy, inexact science and a lack of indisputable documentation, you get a firefighter’s funeral and a promise that the fight for benefits will be never-ending.

Consider that; here you are, not knowing if you will live or die and dealing with all of the mortality issues, “planning for the worst, yet hoping for the best”, as they say and you have no guarantees that those you leave behind will continue to pay because of a very flawed system.

Many continue to feel the nightmare of 9/11. They have been affected in ways that we, who were not there, will never fully understand. A nation felt the loss of almost 3,000 Americans on that day; losses that are felt to this day.

But, the sinister effects of that day continues their nightmarish ways, because losses from a variety of illnesses continue to kill FDNY firefighters, NYPD police officers, Port Authority officers and civilians. It is estimated that to date, 800 have died; post 9/11.

If test samples from The Pile were found to contain high levels of known carcinogens, then how can we possibly claim that those who were there and continue to die are not deserving of LODD status and all benefits accordingly?

Why must we perpetuate this act of terror with the fear that, if you die, your honorable place alongside those killed on 9/11 will be but a footnote?

We must end this nightmare so that our 9/11 heroes can truly rest in peace.

And we must do the same for our brothers and sisters across the country that are having their dreams shattered by illnesses that arise out of the performance of their firefighting duties.

TCSS.

The article as submitted is published under The Adventures of Jake and Vinnie© umbrella and is the intellectual property of Art Goodrich a.k.a. ChiefReason. It is protected by federal copyright laws and cannot be re-printed in any form without expressed permission from the author. You may read other works by the author at www.chiefreasonart.com.

2010 – Will We Do It Again?

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Wet hair, apply shampoo, rub thoroughly into hair, rinse, repeat.

I have always found directions for using shampoo to be rather ridiculous.

That is to say; if you have a chainsaw and a bottle of shampoo in front of you, which one could you most likely pick up and use without reading the directions?

If you said “shampoo”, then congratulations. You just might be smart enough to tackle the more complex chainsaw.

Question: if you have to read instructions before using shampoo, then should you be permitted to engage in more complicated personal hygiene tasks that require using soap, shaving cream, toothpaste, deodorant or (Dear God; grab the kids) a razor?

Wet, apply, rub in, rinse, repeat.

The fire service knows something about this phenomenon of “repeat”, don’t we?

The first thing that we would probably do to memorize this complex task would be to give it an appropriate acronym. Let’s see: W-A-R-R-R!

Hmmm. “War” pronounced like a pirate or Cat Woman would say it; take you pick.

In order for us to learn, we must repeat what we do several times. Hell; in order for us to TEACH a class, we need to review the subject matter repeatedly to get it right.

So, teaching and learning must be done by doing the same task over and over again. But, this time honored and proven learning tool should stop there.

It was never meant for us to repeat our mistakes and especially where men and women have died and data exists that, if read and then taught to firefighters, could reduce the chance that they could be repeated.

Either we are not reading the available information or we need to read the shampoo bottle before using it. Which is it? It could be both!

I know that Bill Carey will be posting a very analytical review of the 2009 LODDs. How many of you will take the time to read it? I know that I will, because I know how to use “shampoo” and I’m sure as Hell going to learn and then teach the lessons learned from the deaths of our brothers and sisters. When you do this, you are honoring them every day.

Do any of you ever look at developing trends in data?

For instance; how many times have we seen “lack of communications” in the LODD report of a fire ground death?

Is it because of a lack of radios or a lack of talking? Could it be confusion over radio frequencies? Perhaps there were so many others talking that no one heard the “may-day”.

Regardless, we have seen it A LOT and continue to see it in reports. I would venture to guess that Communications gets little-to-no training on many departments. Here’s your radio. Leave it on Channel One. You don’t need a spare battery.

Leaders: we have to do a better job.

Firefighters: you have to FORCE your leaders to do a better job.

We should NOT have to hold each other accountable with a conscious effort.

As firefighters; as brothers and sisters, we have sworn to have each others’ back. There should be no excuses, so put away the finger-pointing, cut out the “poor me” crap and if you have to get pissed off to get something done, then I hope that you are over-achievers!

We should have turned the corner years ago in dealing with heart attacks, apparatus and POV accidents while enroot, reading smoke and doing proper size-ups, knowing how and when to vent and knowing when to back the hell out of a structure.

But, still, we keep tripping over those directions found on a bottle of shampoo, because you’re going to get wet, you’re going to work up a lather, someone’s going to rub it in, everything will rinse out in the end, so, we will repeat it!

And just like “shampooing”, we will close our eyes when we do it.

What; no one told you to close your eyes when you shampoo?

Ooh; that’s got to sting!

To close, I will paraphrase the warden in the movie “Cool Hand Luke”:

Get your mind right or you’ll wind up in the box!

TCSS.

The article as submitted is published under The Adventures of Jake and Vinnie© umbrella and is the intellectual property of Art Goodrich a.k.a. ChiefReason. It is protected by federal copyright laws and cannot be re-printed in any form without expressed permission from the author. You may read other works by the author at www.chiefreasonart.com.

Take a Moment With Paul Grimwood

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Author’s Note: I am so proud and so pleased with this interview that I had the privilege of conducting with one of the storied international firefighters of our time. As you read Paul’s biography and his replies to my questions, there is no doubt to the volume of knowledge that my friend possesses.

So, pull up a chair, grab your favorite beverage and enjoy this unique learning experience. And when you are finished, drop Paul a line. He would love to hear from you. Thank you.

Biography

The biography of Paul Grimwood appears in his latest book ‘Euro FireFighter©’, published in 2008.

Paul Grimwood is a thirty-five year veteran of the British Fire Service, having served most of his time as firefighter in London Fire Brigade’s busy West End district. In the mid 1970s he also served an eighteen-month detachment into New York’s South Bronx 7th Division, during the busiest period in FDNY’s history. From 1976-77 he further served as a volunteer firefighter/EMT on Long Island’s south shore.

For more than thirty years Paul has been undertaking global research into structural firefighting strategy and tactics and has contributed in excess of 200 technical articles since 1979, in an effort to advance firefighter safety. During this time he has served and responded out of more 100 fire stations around the world, working alongside some of the finest firefighters you could ever wish to meet. He has also presented papers on fire service operations at international conferences in several countries since 1993.

His other books include ‘Fog Attack©’ (1992) and ‘3D Firefighting©’ (2005), the latter of which he joint authored with firefighting colleagues Battalion Chief Ed Hartin (USA), and Station Officers John McDonough and Shan Raffel (Australia).

From 1984 he served eleven years as a London Fire Brigade fire investigator and was part of the six-person team that investigated the tragic King’s Cross fire in 1987 where thirty-one lives were lost, including a colleague ( Station Officer Colin Townsley) from London’s Soho fire station.

He is a trained USAR instructor (EMT) and was deployed on operational disaster relief assignments into Iraq (1991) and Bosnia (1993). He is also a CFBT and tactical ventilation specialist (1984-2008) and a Tactical Deployment (command and control) and High-rise Firefighting instructor.

Paul is the founder and principal of Firetactics.com®, a website which has provided in excess of 14,000 pages of structural firefighting SOGs in six languages FREE to over 2.5 million visitors from more than seventy countries since July 1999 (source: Webstat.com).

He is an advisor to several UK Government Task Groups including ODPM Compartment Fire Behavior Training; BDAG High-rise Firefighting; CLG High-rise Firefighting, as well as an editorial reviewer for the Fire Safety Journal (the official journal of the International Association of Fire Safety Science). He is also an established ‘expert’ technical witness and advisor in fire service operations, having worked on several high-profile cases in the USA and Europe.

In 2008 Paul was awarded the Institute of Fire Engineers’ (IFE) highest academic status (FIFireE) in recognition of his thirty-year professional commitment to firefighter safety.

Update: Paul is now retired from Ops but working as a Fire Safety Engineer and High-rise Training Instructor for Kent Fire & Rescue in the UK, an active fire department of 66 fire stations that adjoins London Fire Brigade to the SE.

The Interview

CR: Paul; first of all, thank you very much for taking the time for this interview. You know; we still haven’t had that beer together yet?

PG: Art we have been friends for so many years and I can’t believe we haven’t had the opportunity to share that cold one together! Let it be soon!

CR: We all know when you started your career, but at what age did you start looking at a career in the fire service? What were your early influences?

PG: I wanted to be a firefighter from the age of fifteen. I hung around firehouses and made a nuisance of myself. I eventually got hired the day after my 18th birthday and became London’s youngest ever professional firefighter in 1971.

CR: Please name and describe some of your mentors.

PG: I saw good things in many role models through the 1970s. There were several fire chiefs in London of that era who I just have to mention, Roy Baldwin; Tony Wilmott and Tom Stanton who were legends in their time. In the USA I read everything FDNY’s Bill Clarke ever wrote as well as Frank Brannigan and who’s that guy … oh yeah Mittendorf in LA. There was also great advice coming from Leo Stapleton in Boston. I had the opportunity of spending an hour with Commissioner Stapleton in his office just before he went on the golf course, what a great guy.

CR: When you started in the fire service, what were the goals that you set for yourself?

PG: I wanted to be the best at what I did and I wanted to serve with the busiest. When I was initially assigned to London’s busiest of their 114 fire stations – Paddington – in London’s west end district I just couldn’t believe my luck. We picked up many serious working fires mainly in hotels during the early part of the 1970s. There were also streets full of vacants that became my learning ground as they burned on a nightly basis.

CR: Was it ever your plan that “student” would become “teacher”?

PG: No that was never my plan Art. I never even considered it, as I couldn’t imagine leaving station life. But then one day a 35 years veteran firefighter, Bill Willis, retired. His experience was going to be greatly missed when he got off the engine for the last time, I just didn’t know how we would cope. The things he told us about getting in and staying there weren’t written down anywhere. I though ‘ I just have to get this stuff down on paper for future generations of firefighters’. That became my first book – Fog Attack.

CR: You have worked for two of the most storied fire departments in the world.  Was FDNY just a “ride-along” that lasted almost two years or what? Why would you leave London, England for FDNY?

PG: You know I was very lucky. I met a guy in London in 1974 and we became great friends. Bill Bohner was a giant of a man and as the Deputy Chief in charge of the FDNY’s (then) 7th Division (South Bronx) he arranged a long-term detachment into New York City from London for me. I had to return to UK at the end of it but it had been an amazing experience to work with the bravest during the busiest period in their history. Yes I guess it was a ‘ride along’ because I was not qualified to wear a mask in the city but we still got in some pretty good scrapes! After all, the masks were nearly always left on the engine!

CR: Would you discuss the cultural differences (USA/Great Britain) not only in general terms, but also in terms of the fire service? Are the political issues that affect the fire service the same, similar or different?

PG: Cultural differences? Well in the UK we are sadly losing the tradition that stays with the job in the US, for example where there is often a strong family link in the fire service, sometimes through several generations of firefighters. I think it’s important that this tradition remains strong; I also think that US firefighters are way ahead on the moustache! This was a ‘must have’ here in the 1930s and some of the old time pictures hanging the walls of some fire stations in the UK show some real hairy droopers! We’ve lost that cultural identity! The political issues are exactly the same – cuts in public services are now an annual event and I just don’t know how much smaller our fire service can get! You can do a lot with a ‘little’ but the day comes when ‘little’ does a whole lot more to you!

 CR: Compartment Fire Behavior Training (CFBT) has come to define you. Can you describe how it evolved in theory and then into practice?

PG: It was the late 1970s and I had not long returned from the FDNY detachment, I was busy putting all the things I had learned in the US into published articles. ‘Smoke detectors in homes’; ‘Arson Task Forces’; ‘Medically trained First Responders on Engines’ and ‘Structural Venting tactics’ etc. Then I met some Swedish firefighters who told me about some stuff going on in Stockholm. It wasn’t until 1984 that I came to fully appreciate the strategy the Swedes termed ‘offensive firefighting’ where they were directing short sharp bursts of water-fog into the fire gases to get some ‘steam free’ cooling! I was fortunate enough to get on the nozzle at our next fire one night and guess what …. It was a stair-shaft fire …. Four floors alight and then more! We took the entire fire with a 40GPM flow-rate off of a booster line! Now let me tell you, the stair-shaft fire is the ideal scenario for such tactics because any super-hot water vapor just heads on upwards on the thermal draft and this takes out a whole lot more fire as it rises. I was sold on the Swedish tactics. We used this approach on ‘real’ fires many times over the next few years with some wins and a few losses. It was critical to realize the limitations of this method because if there was one thing the FDNY had taught me, it was to flow big water when it was really needed, or the fire was going to come back and get you. CFBT was a derivative of nozzle bursting tactics. You have the Swede Survival cans in the US but we developed the originals with the Swedes and believe me, it’s a very scientific training experience if these training tools are used correctly. You can learn a lot about fire behavior in these facilities (there is a range of simulators based on varied design principles) but you can also become over confident about ‘real’ fires – these are not ‘real’ fires but simply one-third scale fires that burn solely in the gas-phase. Lots of flaming combustion but no real fire base to hit. You need a good instructor to get the best out of these systems and in the US, Chief Ed Hartin is the best! (www.cfbt-us.com).

CR: Tell us how you developed and nurtured this “amalgamation” of the Swedish tactics of bursting water with anti-ventilation tactics versus your higher nozzle flow rates combined with tactical ventilation.

PG: Until the 1990s, venting structures was pretty alien to us! We would keep the fire area closed down inside our brick construction and go find it. As we developed our venting strategy we found we would get a better result by nozzle bursting the interior gases prior to creating openings. Now don’t think for one minute we were boiling trapped occupants or pushing fire around! This strategy demands precision that can only be learned on the live fire. The nozzle applications and fog patterns are carefully applied so as to remain in control of the thermal layering. As I said, sometimes the conditions are just too over-powering for this approach! I remember one fire we had on a Christmas day where black boiling smoke was emerging from all openings at ground level of a store with apartments above. We used two hose-lines from the street entrance doorways, nozzle bursting with alternate three-second hits into the smoke. It worked for us! We were patient and within four to five minutes we vented the windows and there was no backdraft. The fire was out pretty quick on this occasion.

CR: Your tactics weren’t embraced right away, were they? In fact; it took high profile firefighter deaths before you saw the change.

PG: It was tragic as it took three firefighter deaths in two days in February 1996 before the realization dawned that our firefighters knew very little about fire behavior and the hazards associated with ‘rapid fire’ phenomena. It was decided nationally, despite my twelve years of campaigning prior to these two tragedies, that the time had come to develop CFBT (live fire behavior training) for the UK’s 36,000 firefighters.

CR: Even then, CFBT wasn’t translating well to the fire-ground. What were the obstacles?

PG: There was no standard approach; the training objectives were inappropriate; and the training impact was totally missed! An opportunity went astray for several years as we failed to define the limitations of this approach. The concept of CFBT is to teach firefighters how a fire develops from an incipient fire to flashover. It is not a joy ride! It is not a means of teaching how every fire should be fought. It is very easy to become macho and over confident about the learning experience in these things (cans). You have to have a scientific head on to appreciate the learning objectives. You have to train with precision, controlling fire loading and venting parameters in order to give each student the same learning experience. It is not a real fire experience but believe me, it is as close as you need to get outside of the real thing.

CR: I’m sure that you have seen and probably discussed the “great debate”-fog vs. straight stream. What are you thoughts on that?

PG: Never has there been a more lively debate! For me there is no preference. I can extinguish a lot of fire using differing techniques with either a smoothbore or a fog nozzle. What I will say is that high water content in the stream is absolutely critical when the fire has spread beyond the compartment or room of origin!

CR: Paul; I can’t continue without offering you my platitudes for your book Euro FireFighter©. What was appealing to me was how you choreographed your steps towards incident CONTROL. Granted, the book almost overflows with an abundance of great information, but it all comes together as a perfect blueprint for fire officers in the end. How did you manage such a clear focus of what would become this book?

PG: Well thanks for those comments and that view Art. I always intended this book to be an instructor manual. I wanted the reader to take each and every bullet point and prompt debate from students. I found this a great way to develop learning and simply by taking a power-point and going through the bullet points as statements, we can all follow the debate with our own experiences. The incident command modules are logical processes based on the ‘error chains’ so often thrown up where tragedies occur.

CR: NIOSH. You used several reports in Euro FireFighter©. When you review them, are you looking for lessons learned and the critical information that might be a teachable moment down the road?

Does it concern you that we seem to repeat our mistakes in some cases? Do you think that it’s a fallacy that NIOSH uses templates, because their reports’ recommendations are very similar? I believe that they are similar because the incidents’ end results are very similar, as in repeating our mistakes. What say you?

PG: Any time we review reports of past fires we only get a small portion of what really happened. I know from several personal experiences that if you weren’t on the job yourself then any Monday morning quarterbacking is likely to be worthless. Or is it? The fact is that we are not there to criticize the actions of others but more so to immerse ourselves in the ‘error chain’, or any part of it even if we only get one or two links right, then we are right on the money! Wherever there is a fire where things went wrong it is usually the case that a chain of events unfolded, perhaps during the first five minutes following arrival on scene that set up irreversible circumstances leading to tragedy. In fact, we need to look for the point of ‘no return’ in each error chain and learn for ourselves that there IS in fact a point where we may reverse the situation and alter the outcome. Things happen fast and you may or may not be aware the chain is forming right there in front of you until it is too late. Its so important that fire commanders take a step back, take a breath and take it in. Pay close attention to what is occurring in front of you and don’t hesitate to take instant action that might save lives, even if it means pulling out.

Yes we are all guilty of repeating our mistakes. The thing is we get away with them for so long and they don’t take a bite out of us. It’s when we see several of these errors come together in a few short minutes. In each tragedy you will usually note 4-7 links in the chain that evolved early in the fire. I’ll tell you, the biggest omission from the NIOSH LODD reports is any information concerning fire behavior. We have spoke with them about this before but honestly, I just don’t think they understand fire behavior from a practical perspective and they miss obvious indicators and clear warning signs that might serve as good teaching points. Having said that, the NIOSH database of past reports serves as a critical learning tool. There are always things there to discuss, debate and learn from.

CR: At FDIC 2008, Lt. Ray McCormack delivered “the speech” heard around the world. You and I came out on our blogs with comments on his remarks. What did you get out of it?

PG: You know something? I really did get a feel for Ray’s message. I have to saagain that the way he came over was always going to draw responses in opposition from those of us who see the safety of firefighters as a priority. But he does have a point in some situations and I am seeing it more and more every day. In some areas we are going too far down ‘safety alley’. In my area we are given a directive to lay out three charged hose-lines on the upper floors of a high-rise before our firefighters can access the fire-involved area. Now for one thing that virtually writes off any chances of survival of remaining occupants. It also allows the fire to develop and grow bigger. No Ray, you had a good point and made it well in that your words reached out to millions! But you just have to take a step back and see the damage that might occur. You are a unique role model and some young firefighters will take your words as gospel. In the end, whichever side of the equation we originate from, we just need to meet in the middle and that’s all about getting the right balance between ‘risk versus gain’.

CR: You have a compatriot in the United States. Please tell us about Ed Hartin, since he had such nice things to say about you!

PG: Chief Ed Hartin is certainly one of the most outstanding firefighters I have ever met. His constant efforts to improve the education of firefighters and his unique ability to impart a message are typical of Ed’s mission in life. He continues to help firefighters in all parts of the world and I consider myself very fortunate to have met and worked with him because he has made me better at the things I try to do in life. Ed – thanks brother.

CR: Your website www.firetactics.com is extremely popular worldwide. Has it exceeded your expectations? How has technology driven and/or expanded your mission?

PG: You just have to love the worldwide web and yet we now take it for granted. In 1989 when I wrote my first book about international fire-fighting tactics (Fog Attack) I had to type every word without cut and paste. I did tear up a lot of paper! I also had to write to firefighters in several countries and you know, it took two to three weeks to get replies, just for me to write back to them again for more information! It was never ending.

When I managed to get Firetactics.com online I was blessed with a most generous offer from Task Force Tips to host it for me for free and they have done this ever since it first went online in July 1999. Its been a wonderful experience for me and before Firefighter Nation, Firehouse.com or Fire Engineering, ‘Firetactics’ was actually the most searched firefighting website on the web. It brought together firefighters from over 70 nations and I made many great friends through this route. The message was always about safety and firefighting innovations. I want to thank every single one of you who clicked on Firetactics.com in those early years because it told me that the world was full of firefighters that were looking for the very same answers as I was. I hope you found them.

CR: Can you talk about your charities?

PG: There have been many over the years. Lets just hope that some burn victims in the UK, USA and Australia have benefited somewhat from the proceeds. RAFT in the UK is my big one and thanks to the excellent first year sales of EuroFirefighter, the NYC Burns Foundation is about to get a nice check.

CR: Do you get any downtime? Any “Me” time, Paul?

PG: Sure! I love my family and we spend some great times together. But my weeks are getting more full with work as I get older!

CR: Please know that, in the world community known as the brotherhood/sisterhood, you are truly one of the brightest beacons that floods our senses with critical safety and survival techniques that will save our lives. What is next for the enterprise known as Paul Grimwood?

PG: Chief Art – it is you who shines as a beacon. If you only knew how your steadying influence and great words have spread out into the global firefighting brotherhood. You always know how to break things down to simple logic and speak to people in a firm but civil manner in a way that people really listen. I always say that when the going gets really rough Art will be there to take control. I would have loved to have served with you brother.

CR: When are we having that beer together?

PG: When those Yankees pick up the next World Series brother! Oh I’m sorry you’re a football fan!

CR: As is my custom, I always give my guest the last word along with my deep gratitude for their thoughts. Thank you so very much, Paul and you have the floor.

PG: This interview is a true honor for me so thanks Art. I want to thank everyone who has taken any interest in my work and who has taken the time to email me. It is truly gratifying to hear from firefighters how they think something I once wrote might have made their approach safer in a fire. Your personal friendships and lifelong dedication within the profession constantly inspires me to remain working well into my fourth decade. You are all very special people and it has been my great fortune to know you all.

I received an award when working in Malaysia from their Fire Commissioner. It is a lovely golden crested plaque with a red seal of authority. The words on the plaque are so true; it went like this;

‘We must learn to trust our men (and women) who fire fight in the front, they are closest to the dangers and the hazards, therefore that is where real wisdom is’.

The article as submitted is published under The Adventures of Jake and Vinnie© umbrella and is the intellectual property of Art Goodrich a.k.a. ChiefReason. It is protected by federal copyright laws and cannot be re-printed in any form without expressed permission from the author. You may read other works by the author at www.chiefreasonart.com. 

Will Tragic History Be Repeated? You Decide!

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Bill Carey’s blog: http://www.firefighternation.com/profiles/blogs/find-six-for-six got me to thinking about our commitment to those that we have lost, why we lost them and what we are doing to honor them every day and not just once a year.

I believe that what we are witness to is a human behavior that is reinforced by the idea that our losses are not that bad, when compared to other occupations. That argument could be championed were it not for the empirical data that says, “Oh; we have been down that road before”.

Would it be fair to say that; if we are faced with the facts of an LODD that has a clear cause and a common sense, corrective action, we would follow it ourselves and even pass it along?

I would think so, assuming that we have taken the time to read the report.

So; why haven’t we seen any significant progress in reducing firefighter LODD in this country?

We are getting more timely information than ever before. Our mission has never been more defined and still, we can’t make a significant and sustainable impact on reducing LODDs.

I am going to list statistics for 1998 – 2008 and please notice that in the categories that I have chosen to highlight that the change from one year to another is fairly static, with very few exceptions.

2008

Total LODDs – 118

Deaths while responding or returning from a call – 24

Deaths while training – 12

Deaths due to stress/overexertion – 52

2007

Total LODDs – 118

Deaths while responding or returning from a call – 26

Deaths while training – 11

Deaths due to stress/overexertion – 55

2006

Total LODDs – 107

Deaths while responding or returning from a call – 15

Deaths while training – 9

Deaths due to stress/overexertion – 54

2005

Total LODDs – 115

Deaths while responding or returning from a call – 22

Deaths while training – 12

Deaths due to stress/overexertion – 62

2004

Total LODDs – 119

Deaths while responding or returning from a call – 23

Deaths while training – 13

Deaths due to stress/overexertion – 66

2003

Total LODDs – 113

Deaths while responding or returning from a call – 36

Deaths while training – 12

Deaths due to stress/overexertion – 51

2002

Total LODDs – 101

Deaths while responding or returning from a call – 13

Deaths while training – 11

Deaths due to stress/overexertion – 38

2001*

Total LODDs – 107

Deaths while responding or returning from a call – 23

Deaths while training – 14

Deaths due to stress/overexertion – 43

*does not include 9/11

2000

Total LODDs – 105

Deaths while responding or returning from a call – 19

Deaths while training – 13

Deaths due to stress/overexertion – 46

1999

Total LODDs – 114

Deaths while responding or returning from a call – 26

Deaths while training – 3

Deaths due to stress/overexertion – 56

1998

Total LODDs – 93

Deaths while responding or returning from a call – 14

Deaths while training – 12

Deaths due to stress/overexertion – 43

Source: http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/ff_fat08.pdf

Again; we will often comment on someone else’s tragic loss(s) and proclaim our concern that “we are not learning from our mistakes and are destined to repeat them”.

Yet; when a tragedy occurs like what happened in the Russian nightclub:  (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aEqnRLjYbQHY&pos=9), we can’t seem to get our heads around “the whys”.

When you look at this country’s deadliest fires and similarities start to line up, we see patterns of that same human behavior; from owners of these death traps ignoring zoning policies to a person’s lack of or ignorance of basic fire safety procedures (example: have two ways out) and the most prominent mind-set of “It can’t happen here or to me”.

Look at this long list without shaking your head, because we all know that won’t fix it!

We have to take the lead in our communities to avert such tragedies.

How?

With relentless public education starting with our own children, strict ordinances, effective inspections and tough enforcement followed by significant penalties.

Iroquois Theatre Fire – December 30, 1903 in Chicago, IL

602 died in the fire caused by a velvet curtain coming into contact with hot stage lights. Backdrops painted with highly flammable oil paints accelerated the flames. Contributing to the high death toll were no sprinklers over the stage, the fire curtain did not contain the fire, no emergency exit lighting, smoke and heat vents did not work and many exit doors were either locked or did not swing out.

New London School Explosion-March 18, 1937 in New London, TX

296 – 319 died as the result of an undetected natural gas leak. The gas accumulated in a crawl space under the school and filtered through the building until it made contact with an electrical source, igniting an explosion that collapsed the structure. At the time, natural gas was a colorless and odorless gas. As a result, Texas required adding mercaptans to make the gas odorous and more detectable. The practice was soon implemented worldwide. This incident remains the worst school disaster in U.S. history.

Rhythm Night Club Fire-April 23, 1940 in Natchez, MS

209 died in this fast-moving fire that started in front of the main entrance door. The fire spread quickly due to decorative moss that had been draped over the rafters. Due to the dry condition of the moss, it produced flammable methane gas. Contributing to the death toll were windows being boarded up, blinding smoke, panic and ensuing stampede to escape through a back door.

Cocoanut Grove Nightclub Fire-November 28, 1942 in Boston, MA

492 died in the fire that started when someone lit a match, catching paper decorations that adorned the walls and ceilings on fire. It caused panic among the roughly 1,000 people in attendance. The capacity of the club was 460 persons. Contributing to the death toll were no sprinklers and open common areas. Exit doors did not swing out, many doors and windows had been sealed closed and the primary exit was a revolving door. It is the worst night club fire in U.S. history.

Hartford Circus Fire-July 6, 1944 in Hartford, CT

168 died in the fire that started when a side wall of the tent caught fire. Over 100 of the fatalities were children under the age of 15. Contributing to the rapid fire spread was from the tent being coated with a mixture of paraffin and gasoline/kerosene, a common waterproofing process at the time. The rapid fire growth also caused the tent to collapse, trapping spectators beneath the burning debris. There were also inadequate exits, blocked exits and over-crowding that made escape difficult, if not impossible.

Winecoff Hotel Fire-December 7, 1946 in Atlanta, GA

119 hotel guests died after an early morning fire spread very quickly through the hotel. It trapped many people on the upper floors and many jumped from windows to their death. Contributing to the death toll were no sprinklers, only one exit stairway which became impassable in the early stages of the fire, because many of the doors had been propped open. There no fire alarms as well. It is the deadliest hotel fire in U.S. history.

Our Lady of the Angels School Fire-December 1, 1958 in Chicago, IL

95 fatalities resulted from a fire that started in a cardboard trash can located in a basement stairwell. 92 of the victims were children. Contributing to the death toll was the wooden stair banister that spread the fire to the second floor and attic. This blocked escape from the second floor. Furthermore, combustible walls and ceilings accelerated fire growth with no sprinklers to contain the flames, no automatic fire alarms causing a delayed response from Chicago FD. The exit stairway was also not enclosed. As a result of this fire, Life Safety codes were developed.

Beverly Hills Supper Club-May 28, 1977 in Southgate, KY

165 dinner guests died from what was believed to be an electrical fire attributed to aluminum wiring. Contributing to the death toll were the club’s open design, spiral staircases, corridors and dining rooms. Over-crowding, lack of sprinklers and obscured exit signs made a rapid escape for the 3000 guest and 200 employees very difficult.

MGM Grand Hotel Fire-November 21, 1980 in Las Vegas, NV

87 hotel guests died and more than 700 injured when an electrical fire spread through the 26-story structure. Contributing factors were PVC piping, wallpaper and plastic mirrors that created smoke and toxic fumes. In addition, there were no automatic sprinklers in the casino portion of the building that had hazardous wall and ceiling finishes. The hotel portion had many unprotected vertical shafts, openings that allowed smoke to enter and fill the exit stairwell and doors automatically locked behind people once they exited into the smoke-filled stairwells.

Happy Land Fire-March 25, 1990 in New York City, NY

87 club-goers died when they could not escape from a fire that was intentionally set. Contributing to the loss of life were fire exits were blocked to prevent patrons from sneaking in, no alarms or sprinkler system and the fire was set in the only stairwell. Some were able to escape by knocking down a metal security gate.

Station Nightclub Fire-February 20, 2003 in West Warwick, RI

100 patrons died from a fire caused when the rock band Great White’s tour manager set off pyrotechnics at the beginning of their show. This caused the soundproofing foam at the back of the stage to catch fire, race to the ceiling and spread very quickly. Panic caused the 404 patrons to race to the front entrance to escape the acrid smoke. Contributing to the death toll were no automatic sprinklers and failure to use other exit routes.

In addition to these historic fires, there are some noteworthy incidents with multiple fatalities that occurred when the victims made a panicked effort to exit a facility as a result of an “other-than-fire” emergency.

If you have ever wondered why you can’t yell “FIRE” in a crowded theatre; well, here it is:

The Italian Hall Disaster-December 24, 1913 in Calumet, MI

73 people-mostly children-died in the Italian Hall Disaster in Calumet, Michigan. The tragedy occurred during the copper mine strikes on Christmas Eve in 1913. It was a benefit Christmas party for the children of striking miners in Calumet.

The program was in the upstairs of the Italian Hall. During the program, a man or men opened the doors at the bottom of the stairs leading to the outside and yelled “Fire”.

The participants of the party, mostly children, rushed down the stairs and tried to get out.

There was no fire. The doors opened inward and the first children to the doors were crushed against them. More and more party-goers came down the stairs.

It was believed that strike breakers hired by the mine captains committed this heinous act, but no one was ever found or convicted. All died of suffocation.

Nearly whole families died that day.

The Italian Hall was torn down, but they left the doorway and a plaque in memoriam.

The Who Concert Stampede-December 3, 1979 in Cincinnati OH

While waiting to get into a concert by the Who, 11 fans were crushed to death and dozens injured.

Festival seating or general admission was partially blamed for the tragedy. In addition, there was a lack of security and ticket takers. The practice of festival seating was banned in Cincinnati shortly thereafter.

E2 Nightclub Stampede-February 17, 2003 in Chicago, IL

The Epitome Chicago and its upstairs dance floor, E2, was a popular nightclub in Chicago. It was reported that the stampede that caused the deaths of 21 patrons and injuries to more than 50 was the use of pepper spray to break up a fight.

Patrons unfamiliar with its noxious odor panicked and rushed to the exits. Victims were trampled to death and others died of suffocation. The only exit known to most were the narrow, steep front stairwell with narrow doors that opened in; a fire code violation. As more victims tried to get out, they were forced onto victims who had already fallen and were against the exit doors and blocked attempts to get the doors open.

More than 1500 patrons were reported at the nightclub that evening.

Source for highlighted information: Google search

Once again, I will say that we must take the lead to protect our citizens from themselves. It starts with educating them and then identifying the establishments that pose significant risks to public safety.

TCSS.

The article as submitted is published under The Adventures of Jake and Vinnie© umbrella and is the intellectual property of Art Goodrich a.k.a. ChiefReason. It is protected by federal copyright laws and cannot be re-printed in any form without expressed permission from the author. You may read other works by the author at www.chiefreasonart.com.

Be Honest; Call It Bureaucratic Bulls**t!

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I will provide the pertinent links at the end of this blog. But first…the blog.

On February 9, 2007, a terrible tragedy occurred in Baltimore, MD.

Fire Cadet Racheal Wilson died during a live burn training exercise at an abandoned row house. Her death lit up the fire service discussion boards across this country over a multiplex of issues. The incident brought swift and sweeping changes within the Baltimore City Fire Department; most notably the removal of the Director of Training and the resignation of Chief  William Goodwin.

Despite our opinions for some of the many issues involved in this tragedy, it cannot be refuted or disputed that Fire Cadet, Firefighter Apprentice, Firefighter Candidate, Firefighter Trainee, Probationary Firefighter* Racheal Wilson was employed by the City of Baltimore and more precisely, by the Baltimore City Fire Department at the time of her death.

*(There was some confusion over the proper terminology with regards to a firefighter in the process of completing their training)

Who can argue that Cadet Wilson was not an employee of the fire department? It would seem pretty obvious. The NIOSH LODD report (http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200709.html ) states in its opening sentence, On February 9, 2007, a 29-year-old female, career probationary firefighter died…

Pretty specific, wouldn’t you say? So; what could be the issue?

Fire Cadet Wilson was at work on February 9, 2007, was involved in a training exercise as part of her final phase of training, died while training at work for her employer and at the time of her death, engaged in tasks that were required as part of her job as an employee of the Baltimore City Fire Department for the City of Baltimore.

Therefore, under the Public Safety Officers Benefits (PSOB) program, Fire Cadet Wilson’s surviving family members-in this case, her two children-should receive a lump sum pay out of PSOBs in the amount of $295,194.

Nope!

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), at least for the moment, is DENYING THIS CLAIM submitted on behalf of the children by their father.

The reason (because there is ALWAYS a reason)?

According to sources, it is because the Baltimore City Fire Department failed to submit paperwork establishing her eligibility for the funds.

WTF? (This means, “What did I just read/hear”)

Now; I have two questions to ask: 1) WHERE IS THE NATIONAL OUTRAGE OVER THIS BUREAUCRATIC NONSENSE? And 2) Why wouldn’t the application for PSOBs be included in everyone’s insurance packets, post employment paperwork or beneficiary designation documents, as part of their Human Resources employee management tools?

It is strange that we will bust our asses to get the all-important exit interview from some bottom-feeding under-achiever, but we can’t insure that death benefits are properly AND promptly paid? (Hey; HR gurus…write PPP on your whiteboards. If you can remember what SHRM means, you should be able to decipher Properly Promptly Paid death benefits.)

More on the outrage.

Were it not for our good friends at www.firefighterclosecalls.com, www.firefighternation.com and our top bloggers at www.fireemsblogs.com, this story would be nothing more than a gnat on the wall.

Local coverage in the Baltimore area indicates that everyone involved wants this fixed post haste! It’s been over two weeks ago that the story broke and I hope that they don’t have to follow a formal appeals process.

I would think that, if the original application was missing a document, then the caveat should be to provide the document and release the benefits.

But, I have to wonder out loud to whether bureaucracy can be so easily pushed aside and the moral/ethical conclusion be drawn and benefits paid!

When people close to this injustice are telling the media that they will do whatever they need to do to fix this and it is still left undone, one also has to wonder if we are too spellbound by the media circus surrounding the trial of a mayor and her gift cards to see that our justice is served for Racheal Wilson’s children.

So; get the PSOB money into a trust for the two children of Fire Cadet Racheal Wilson.

Let the City of Baltimore get through its most recent governmental guffaws.

Let the Baltimore City Fire Department continue to strengthen their resolve to meet their challenges and to fulfill their mission to their department, their city and their citizens.

Resolve the PSOB issue NOW, so that Racheal Wilson can rest in peace and her children can live the rest of their lives in peace.

To FIREFIGHTER Racheal Wilson…

The dead have peace, but the living weep.~Samuel Hoffenstein

Here are the links that I promised:

http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bal-md.ci.fire06nov06,0,7495567.story

http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/editorial/bal-ed.wilson06nov06,0,5421498.story

http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bal-md.ci.fire05nov05,0,7036813.story

http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bal-md.ci.fire19dec19,0,7827817.story

http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bal-wilson0210,0,1969483.story

http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bal-wilsonside0210,0,7808105.story

http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200709.html

http://www.firefighternation.com/profiles/blogs/baptism-by-fire-or-death-by

The article is protected by federal copyright law under The Adventures of Jake and Vinnie© umbrella. It is written and submitted by Art Goodrich a.k.a. ChiefReason. This article or any other article submitted under The Adventures of Jake and Vinnie© umbrella cannot be reproduced in ANY form without the expressed, written permission of the author. Violations are punishable by applicable laws. Please visit: www.chiefreasonart.com

Trading Precious Resources for TIN!

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Having been involved in the fire service for almost 30 years, I have read and discussed firefighter deaths, as well as listen to many fire service intellectuals espouse their opinions on our fatality rate compared to other occupations, risk vs. gain, community expectations, etc.

What I have found is that there are TWO, distinctly separate camps, where it comes to what is “acceptable” and what is not. That is; there are those who believe that an average of 100 deaths a year isn’t bad, when you consider the “dangers” that we face and then there is the other side who believes that ONE is too many, if it could be prevented and that 100 deaths a year are UNACCEPTABLE.

Personally, I wish that we could put jealousies and egos aside and get crackin’ on a truly productive effort to bring down the line of duty deaths from firefighting activities. If you haven’t noticed, we are killing ourselves the majority of the time because, though being what we are and doing what we do beats strongly in our hearts, our hearts have been weakened by poor diet, lack of exercise and the stressors of the job, causing fatal heart attacks.

We are also killing ourselves going to and from the scene and killing others as well. Apparatus accidents and POV accidents are increasing at an alarming rate and we still have those that STILL refuse to buckle their seatbelt.

Approximately 20 percent of LODDs are the result of injuries incurred during actual fire suppression operations and this is the statistic that is favored by the first camp and that would be all well and good were it not for the issues that were involved in contributing/causing the death (s).

And when guys like me want to step back and look at the “big” picture in the hopes of peeling back the lessons learned/the takeaways, we are called “armchair and Monday morning quarterbacks, Safety Sallies, gutless, ball-less, embarrassment to the profession” and my favorite- “too safe”; just to name a few. I am well past getting upset about it anymore.

Firefighting is a risk-based business-we HAVE to take risks or we’re not doing our jobs.

Really?

Well then; we are going to look at a double LODD from West Virginia and then you tell me if you still feel that we should trade our firefighters-our precious resources-for a tin can.

In Grimwood’s book Euro Firefighter©, Paul describes the “error chain”. In the error chain, Grimwood states:

The ‘error chain’ is a concept that describes human error accidents as the results of a sequence of events that culminates in death or serious injury. Typically, there is usually a chain of mistakes, or omissions, inactions, or failings, that all contribute to the final outcome…

Familiarizing firefighters with the concept of recognizing and eliminating the error chain can prevent an accident before it can occur…

There are some critical clues to identifying links in the error chain. They are divided into: Operational factors and Human Behavior factors…

The presence of any one factor (or more) does not mean that an accident will occur. Rather, it indicates rising risk levels in field operations and that firefighters and fire officers must maintain control through effective management of both risk and resources, in order to eliminate unsafe acts, unsafe conditions and unsafe behavior.

On Thursday, February 19, 2009, Craigsville-Beaver-Cottle Fire Department in Nicholas County, West Virginia lost Lt. Johnnie Howard Hammons and FF Timothy Allen Nicholas during fire suppressions operations. Both were experienced firefighters, according to records ( http://www.register-herald.com/archivesearch/local_story_051234439.html ).

According to the NIOSH report ( http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200907.html ), Victim #1 (Hammons) and Victim #2 (Nicholas) entered the front door of the mobile home trailer with a charged 1-1/2 inch hose line. Within 5 to 10 minutes of them entering, the pump operator sounded the evacuation alarm when he noticed that his tank water was low. The victims did not evacuate from the structure. Firefighters on scene attempted to contact them via radio and by yelling into the mobile home. The fire chief and a firefighter tugged on the hoseline several times with no response. They then pulled on the hoseline and it came freely from the mobile home. Both victims were found in the front room, several feet from the front door.*

*Names of victims were added by author. Names of victims are not contained in NIOSH reports.

Using Grimwood’s template for the ‘error chain’, we will dissect the investigation report of NIOSH.

Text from the NIOSH report will appear in italics.

From the NIOSH Summary:

Their facepieces were not on when they were found…

According to the medical examiner’s office, the victims died from smoke inhalation and thermal inhalation. The carboxyhemoglobin (carbon monoxide poisoning) levels were 63% in Victim #1 and 64% in Victim #2. The toxicology reports for both victims showed lethal doses of cyanide in their systems.

It is hypothesized that based on injuries, positions of the bodies when found and the condition in which the victims were found leads investigators to believe that the victims did not enter the structure on air. Masks were found hanging unattached to either victims’ face. Entering into an IDLH atmosphere without proper PPE greatly compromises the safety of entrants. Obvious are the breach in the Human Behavior factors in the ‘error chain’; however, several Operational factors were present, including but not limited to:

- Lack of SCBA maintenance program.

- SCBAs not equipped with PASS alarms.

- Incident Command directly involved with fire ground activities.

- Wind conditions pushing smoke though the mobile home (horizontal chimney effect).

- Anchor for strap on SCBA mask missing, compromising a positive seal.

- No radio carried by interior crew.

- Incident Commander did not take command by naming incident, designating command post and did not give initial report on conditions.

- Incident Commander was initially helping with traffic control, pulling electrical meter and helping with pump operations.

By performing these tasks, the Incident Commander lost control of initial firefighting activities of the victims, firefighting activities of other fire suppression teams and the search and rescue of firefighters.

In addition, changing fire conditions were not monitored or communicated and fire suppression efforts were not coordinated.

A Personal Accountability Report (PAR) is essential to an accountability system. It was known that two firefighters were missing, but their names were unknown at the scene. A call back to the fire station had to be made to determine the names of the missing.

Furthermore, no Incident Safety Officer (ISO) was established to assist the Incident Commander with accountability, firefighter safety or ensuring the donning of PPE.

Would a properly trained ISO have allowed entry into the structure at all and if so, without firefighters being properly attired in PPE, including SCBA and on air?

No Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) was staged and prepared to respond to a firefighter emergency. No one trained in RIT was on scene that day, so the Incident Commander chose them based on experience once he realized that he had a firefighter emergency.

Mobile homes are unlike common residential homes in that they act as a horizontal chimney, because of their narrow width with narrow hallways. It was reported that a hose team using a 2-1/2 inch diameter hose was working at the opposite end of the trailer from the victims. Once inside, they switched from straight stream to fog, changing the thermal balance by introducing more air flow due to the nozzle setting. As the rescue team on the A-side of the trailer was conducting their search for the victims, they reported very hot, smoky conditions from the D-side, where the other hose team was operating. The D-side team only stopped when they ran low on air and exited the structure, taking their hose to the A-side. The Incident Commander took the hose on fog and aimed it through the front door, immediately dissipating the smoke and heat and allowing the rescue team to find the victims.

The department Standard Operating Guidelines (SOGs) were “out-dated” and were in the process of being updated. It was noted by investigators that the SOGs were mostly administrative in nature and lacked detailed fire ground operations.

Both victims had their Nomex® hoods rolled down on their necks. Victim #1’s helmet was found on the couch…as if it had been taken off and laid there. Both victims’ facepieces were found hanging at waist level with their regulators attached, possibly indicating that they were stored in this manner.

It was noted that the department was using both low pressure tanks and high pressure tanks. Some had integrated PASS alarms, some had stand-alone PASS devices and some without any PASS device. Soot was found inside and outside of the facepieces of the victims; another indication that the facepieces were not being worn by the victims.

Facepieces had not been flow tested since March of 2002. Investigators also determined that SCBA bottles had not been recently hydro-statically tested.

Firefighters did not have personal facepieces, but instead, shared them. Questions of proper fit-testing procedures and medical evaluations for respirators were raised. It was noted that many fire department members, including Victim #1 had excessive facial hair and beards.

During the initial phases of the incident, E32 could not pump water, because the truck was in the wrong gear. It was corrected by the Incident Commander and water was then available from E32.

Wind conditions at the time of the call were steady at 15 miles per hour with gusts up to 24 miles per hour. It was reported that weather conditions were not properly considered when employing fire suppression operations.

The structure’s integrity after having been under heavy fire load contributed to a firefighter falling through the floor during interior fire suppression operations. Fortunately, he continued to spray water and was successfully extricated without injury.

This is a very tragic incident that cost two men their lives and their families will be without them forever more.

The problems with the investigative materials that come out after we have laid fallen firefighters to rest is that they are not lauded for their critical review of the available evidence, but instead are seen as criticisms.

When we look at what leads to or contributes to the deaths of our brothers and sisters, we have to set aside our emotions, maintain an open mind, fully digest and process the information so that we can learn from it.

In this case, we have to understand that fighting fires in mobile homes presents unusual challenges and cannot be treated with the same tactics employed at a wood framed, light-weight constructed residence. If you don’t remember anything else, remember “horizontal chimney”.

And to firmly grasp the concept and the evolution of the “error chain” as defined by Grimwood, I recommend that you read this NIOSH report.

If you find any similarities to your department, I strongly urge you to change it NOW. We owe it to Lt. Johnnie Howard Hammons and Firefighter Timothy Allen Nicholas.

If we don’t change it now, we will continue to trade firefighters-precious resources-for tin.

TCSS.

The article as submitted is published under The Adventures of Jake and Vinnie© umbrella and is the intellectual property of Art Goodrich a.k.a. ChiefReason. It is protected by federal copyright laws and cannot be re-printed in any form without expressed permission from the author. You may read other works by the author at www.chiefreasonart.com.

LODD? Not So Fast!

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I have found it increasingly confusing when looking for the hard/fast LODD number. I don’t have this macabre fascination with firefighter deaths, but I look at the reports to find trends that indicate that we are moving in the right direction in reducing the number of LODDs.

 

If you look at Firefighter Fatalities in the United States-2008 that was released in July of this year by the NFPA, there were 103 LODDs in 2008. Their definition of on-duty deaths is as follows:

 

Each year, NFPA collects data on all firefighter fatalities in the U.S. that resulted from injuries or

illnesses that occurred while the victims were on-duty. The term on-duty refers to being at the scene of

an alarm, whether a fire or non-fire incident; while responding to or returning from an alarm; while

participating in other fire department duties such as training, maintenance, public education, inspection,

investigation, court testimony or fund raising; and being on call or stand-by for assignment at a location

Firefighter Fatalities in the U.S., 7/09 2 NFPA Fire Analysis and Research, Quincy, MA.

other than at the firefighter’s home or place of business.

On-duty fatalities include any injury sustained in the line of duty that proves fatal, any illness

that was incurred as a result of actions while on duty that proves fatal, and fatal mishaps involving nonemergency

occupational hazards that occur while on duty. The types of injuries included in the first

category are mainly those that occur at a fire or other emergency incident scene, in training, or in crashes

while responding to or returning from alarms. Illnesses (including heart attacks) are included when the

exposure or onset of symptoms occurred during a specific incident or on-duty activity.

The victims include members of local career and volunteer fire departments; seasonal, full-time

and contract employees of state and federal agencies who have fire suppression responsibilities as part

of their job description; prison inmates serving on firefighting crews; military personnel performing

assigned fire suppression activities; civilian firefighters working at military installations; and members

of industrial fire brigades.

Fatal injuries and illnesses are included even in cases where death is considerably delayed.

 

If you look at Firefighter Fatalities in the United States in 2008 that was released in September of this year by the USFA, there were 107 LODDs in 2008. However; an additional 11 fatalities qualified under the Hometown Heroes Survivor’s Benefit Act, bringing the 2008 total to 118. Their definition of on-duty deaths is as follows:

 

On-duty fatalities include any injury or illness sustained while on duty that proves fatal. The term “on-duty” refers to being involved in operations at the scene of an emergency, whether it is a fire or non-fire incident; responding to or returning from an incident; performing other officially assigned duties such as training, maintenance, public education, inspection, investigations, court testimony, and fundraising; and being on-call, under orders, or on standby duty except at the individual’s home or place of business. An individual who experiences a heart attack or other fatal injury at home while he or she prepares to respond to an emergency is considered on-duty when the response begins. A firefighter that becomes ill while performing fire department duties and suffers a heart attack shortly after arriving home or at another location may be considered on-duty since the inception of the heart attack occurred while the firefighter was on duty.

On December 15, 2003, the President of the United States signed into law the Hometown Heroes Survivors Benefit Act of 2003. After being signed by the President, the Act became Public Law 108-182. The law presumes that a heart attack or stroke are in the line of duty if the firefighter was engaged in non-routine stressful or strenuous physical activity while on duty and the firefighter becomes ill while on duty or within 24 hours after engaging in such activity.

The inclusion criteria for this study have been impacted by this change in the law. Previous to December 15, 2003, firefighters who became ill as the result of a heart attack or stroke after going off duty needed to register some complaint of not feeling well while still on duty in order to be included in this study. For firefighter fatalities after December 15, 2003, firefighters will be included in this study if they become ill as the result of a heart attack or stroke within 24 hours of a training activity or emergency response. Firefighters who become ill after going off duty where the activities while on duty were limited to tasks that did not involve physical or mental stress will not be included in this study.

A fatality may be caused directly by an accidental or intentional injury in either emergency or nonemergency circumstances, or it may be attributed to an occupationally related fatal illness. A common example of a fatal illness incurred on duty is a heart attack. Fatalities attributed to occupational illnesses would also include a communicable disease contracted while on duty that proved fatal when the disease could be attributed to a documented occupational exposure.

Firefighter fatalities are included in this report even when death is considerably delayed after the original incident. When the incident and the death occur in different years, the analysis counts the fatality as having occurred in the year in which the incident took place. One firefighter died in 2008 from injuries sustained in a 1999 incident, bringing that year’s total to 114. Information about this death in Massachusetts is included in Appendix A of this report.

There is no established mechanism for identifying fatalities that result from illnesses such as cancer that develop over long periods of time and which may be related to occupational exposure to hazardous materials or toxic products of combustion. It has proved to be very difficult over the years to provide a complete evaluation of an occupational illness as a causal factor in firefighter deaths due to the following limitations: the exposure of firefighters to toxic hazards is not sufficiently tracked; the often delayed long-term effects of such toxic hazard exposures; and the exposures firefighters may receive while off duty.

 

So, as you can see, since December of 2003, the number of fatalities and what constitutes an LODD has changed. What does it mean? It means that, if you quote NFPA, there were 103 LODDs in 2008. If you quote USFA, there were 107 LODDs in 2008 and if you include criteria for HHSBA, there were 118 LODDs in 2008.

 

For me, the failure to draw statistical data from ONE source and especially where just one fatality can skew the results is disconcerting. And when discussing LODD, if you are looking at whether programs are helping to bring the number down, you might cite the lower number, but where you are arguing that more needs to be done, you may cite the higher number. If everyone is quoting the same source of information, then there can be no confusion.

 

In closing, I would like to invite everyone to re-visit Bill Carey’s article that was written earlier this year: http://www.firefighternation.com/profiles/blogs/2009-lodd-6month-summary-1

 

And I would like to point to a couple of interesting stats in the NFPA report for 2008 fatalities:

 

First, heart attacks in 2008 accounted for 41% of all career FF LODDs. Heart attacks in 2008 accounted for 52% of all volunteer FF LODDs.

 

Age groups – Career (21-25) 1 LODD; (61-65) 1 LODD; (66-70) 0 LODD; (over 70) 0 LODD.

Volunteer (21-25) 8 LODD; (61-65) 6 LODD; (66-70) 4 LODD; (over 70) 8 LODD.

 

Years of service – Career (5 or less) 4 LODD; (over 30) 2 LODD.

Volunteer (5 or less) 19 LODD; (over 30) 13 LODD.

 

If you read the reports, you may find information that will change the way that you recruit, retain and train your firefighters. We might very well find ourselves facing tough questions and tough decisions down the road if we want to continue our services.

 

If we truly believe that we learn from our mistakes, then the empirical data that we review and choose to ignore isn’t a “mistake”; it’s a crime.

 

We need to get it right.

 

This article is published under The Adventures of Jake and Vinnie© umbrella and is written by Art Goodrich a.k.a. ChiefReason. It is protected by federal copyright laws and cannot be re-produced in any form without the expressed permission of the author. Please visit www.chiefreasonart.com.

When a Discussion Reaches Flashover

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Throughout my years on the discussion boards, I have had the unique opportunity to engage in some of the most interesting conversations on an eclectic array of subject matter.

 

The whole idea of discussing issues is to learn more about the issue and the different perspectives. It has never been my intent to shove my opinion down anyone’s throat. It has never been done to get everyone to agree with me or to hear those three, magical words, “you are right”.

 

When the little guy in my head tells me that he has something to say, I grab a favorite cigar (tonight, it is an Alec Bradley Tempus Torpedo), my iPod, put on my Harley hat, get a legal pad and pen and go to my smoking office (laundry room adjacent to the garage). Yes; I write everything out in long hand (is that a lost art form?), make as many changes before I sit down at the computer and put it into a Word document that is to become a blog.

 

The title of this blog infers that any discussion can get hot and certainly, any discussion has that potential. But actually, I was referring to the discussion TOPIC; and I have found that there are really TWO topics that will explode into a fiery abyss that will melt common sense as emotion vents out in a rage that will find participants leaping en masse towards safety.

 

The TWO topics? Firefighter deaths (LODD) and politics!

 

I have written several articles on both topics. I have been fortunate in that I haven’t been threatened in any way for my expressed views. Some insults have been thrown, but for the most part, my articles have been well received because of their timing and their detailed information. Other participants have been less fortunate and that is the first part of this article.

 

On firefighter, Line-Of-Duty-Death (LODD):

 

I have written blogs that discuss the timing of disclosing our opinions on the reasons for a firefighter(s) death. The mere fact that the subject is brought is a sacrilege to some. It is viewed as disrespect, unwanted criticism and an affront to the brotherhood/sisterhood. Rarely is it seen as honoring the death through open discussion, so that we can learn from it to keep others from dying in a similar manner. Apparently, THAT is viewed as a weak argument.

 

Because the loss of one of our own is so highly emotional, a response may not be properly worded or it is taken completely out of context and misconstrued.

 

How many of you are like me, in that, when we receive word of a firefighter death, our very first thought is “how did it happen?”

 

Once we find out how it happened, we wonder “how COULD it happen?” When LODD reports take a year to release, we are left to try and piece it together, because for each day that we don’t figure that out, it is putting us closer to our own LODD. There is that sense of urgency that FORCES the discussion and to infringe upon the aggrieved’s private Hell.

 

Therein lays the issue.

 

What we do is a very public job. When something happens to us, that too, is very public and so are its causes. There are many occupations that won’t even make a blip on the public’s radar screen, but firefighting will light it up with a million lumens!

 

So, we scream for some decency and privacy as we honor the fallen in a very public display of brotherhood/sisterhood with our firefighter’s funeral.

 

As we make our way through the streets of our community with the flag draped coffin on the hose bed of the engine, we want “privacy”?

 

Do we want our public’s involvement with pre-conditions? I have a deep philosophical issue with this. We can’t take public money, seek community support with the talks of cutbacks, cite them for code violations, accept their condolences to us and then tell them that they don’t have a right to know how their firefighter died. Yes; that is problematic for me, because it allows “cynicism” to creep in.

 

All of the major firefighter websites have Line-Of-Duty-Death (LODD) sections where their intent is for us to go there and offer our condolences to the family, friends and fire departments of the fallen firefighter. It is NOT where questions or opinions should be left. That would be disrespectful. If you don’t know what to say, then don’t say it. “I’m sorry for your loss” is sufficient. KNOW the difference between a condolence forum and a discussion forum. Any question, you should rule on the side of caution and simply leave a condolence message only.

 

On the other hand, it should come as no surprise that a discussion is started to analyze the causes of the death to arrive at the lessons learned, but it might get hot, so dress for it!

 

Politics is the other hot topic.

 

I am not referring to the Republican vs. Democrat brand of politics, but politics in the broad, philosophical sense.

 

Many will declare that they don’t get involved in the politics and that is absolutely not true!

 

From the day that you spoke your first words and broke the lamp on the end table, you got involved in politics, because you were negotiating your way out of trouble for breaking that lamp. You reached the height of politics only after you mastered the art of playing Mom against Dad. Dad had pocket veto, but Mom was your powerful lobbyist and Mom usually got what she wanted.

 

Every day that you attended school, you were politicking for your place in its social structure or your place on the sports team.

 

As you grew older, you started your campaign with the “other” party-the opposite sex. Tell me THAT didn’t require superb, political skill to guide you to the victory of that first kiss!

 

With our skills sharpened, we took it to college or into the job market, where politics would be prevalent, but transparent.

 

Then, for the lucky ones; they got to the fire department test, the interview and eventually to the job. Can you honestly say that politics played no part? No; you can’t!

 

You joined the union? Politics.

 

You joined the volunteer fire department? Politics.

 

You decided that you wanted to become an officer in your department? More politics.

 

Things didn’t turn out like you wanted? I’ll bet the house that politics played a significant role in your situation.

 

What about your equipment and the money to purchase it? How can that NOT be a political issue?

 

Like it or not, politics is an integral ingredient and you may unwittingly be its casualty. Some would even argue that an LODD might be the result of politics gone awry. Think back to 9/11 and the discussions about radio communications. Reports surfaced that the purchasing system for radios was flawed, dead spots had been identified but not fixed and there was a shortage of radios as well. The fact that the 9/11 Commission was formed speaks volumes to the politicization that appeared post incident.

 

The most recent, multiple LODD incident to see politics at its worst was the Charleston fire. The city government and fire department were cited on numerous levels in most of the reports for creating or contributing to a culture that allowed politics to set a series of errors into motion that took the lives of nine firefighters.

 

And it created a firestorm beyond the fire itself.

 

So, if you’re a firefighter in this country, don’t think for a minute that you can separate what you do or what you will do from politics.

 

You won’t take a class on it or a written test, but its influences will definitely be there and you need to figure out how you’re going to deal with it…

 

Because, it’s not going to go away.

 

And don’t forget; we are already dealing with Murphy!

 

The article as submitted is published under The Adventures of Jake and Vinnie© umbrella and is the intellectual property of Art Goodrich a.k.a. xchief22 and ChiefReason. It is protected by federal copyright laws and cannot be re-printed in any form without expressed permission from the author. You may read other works by the author at www.chiefreasonart.com.

Preparing For An LODD

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First Published 3/16/03

 

We have all experienced the loss of a loved one. In some cases, we can remember where we were and what we were doing when we got word. We have been there during the final moments. With others, we have had time to prepare for an impending death. Unpleasant thought that it is, we have found ourselves thinking about what we would do at the time of the passing of a loved one.

 

As family and friends gather before, during and after the funeral, we cope because we draw on each other’s strength. Someone, possibly an elder member of the family, becomes the “gentle hand on the shoulder”; that voice that speaks with the soft re-assurance that we’ll get through this crisis together. We will be better people for having known our lost loved one.

 

But then, while working the scene of a two-story, wood frame family dwelling, the silence of the night is shattered by “Mayday. Mayday. Firefighter down”!

 

You are there and it’s real. No phone call; no time to “prepare”! It’s happening right in front of you and a thousand thoughts are racing through your mind.

 

It is at this point that the incident has turned into a disaster that has become personal.

 

As a company officer, be it chief, assistant chief, captain or lieutenant, we are taught not to dwell on the thought of a firefighter dying while in the line of duty. Whether they die while pulling hose or are caught in a flashover or structural collapse, your emotional state at that moment could cause you to lose control of the scene and therefore, compromise it’s safety.

Just as an officer would prepare his crew for a ventilation exercise, an officer must prepare himself for the emotional upheaval that an LODD will cause at the scene. A systematic approach will get you and your crew backs safely to the station, where additional support in the form of critical incident stress de-briefing (CISD) can be initiated. Until then, incident management should continue, emergency personnel should be closely supervised and control of the scene should be maintained, including crowd control and scene security as the second phase begins: recovery of personnel.

Even with emotions running high, the recovery process must utilize the same considerations of any other rescue operation. Again, closer monitoring of personnel is essential to continued safe operation.

Key considerations are:

1)     It is a crime scene until proven otherwise.

2)     Removing the body(s) or leaving in place.

3)     Accounting for all personnel.

4)     Gaining positive identification of the deceased.

5)     Notifying the family and assigning a department representative to them.

During the investigation of the LODD, it is best to use a third party. This will eliminate any claim of impropriety by community members and even firefighters. So, though you may have the department resource to conduct such an investigation under normal circumstances, consider using outside investigators in conjunction with your state fire marshal, NIOSH, OSHA, ATF, NFPA, NIST, other firefighter organizations and your department’s safety and health officer.

 

All safety equipment that was used and worn at the time of the LODD, such as turnout gear, SCBA, PASS device, etc. should be documented, photographed and placed into a secure container. Further testing and viewing by investigators necessitates limiting its handling by only those personnel involved in the incident.

The autopsy is a very vital phase of the investigation of an LODD, due to the application for death benefits. Information needed from the autopsy is the cause of death, carbon monoxide levels, toxicology and blood alcohol results. In many states, the presence of drugs or alcohol in the system at the time of death may void some death benefits. The Department of the Treasury will require a number of documents when application is made for Public Safety Officer Death Benefits.

 

Because of multiple requests for documents, you may need to secure several original copies or certified copies, depending on the benefits being applied for. Those documents may include death certificate, birth certificate, marriage license, children’s birth certificates (for survivor benefits), notarized letter on official department letterhead from the chief of department stating the facts of the events that caused the firefighter’s death and original medical examiner, toxicology, blood alcohol and investigator’s reports; all requiring original signatures and raised notary seals. You will also want a verification of surviving children who are full time students.

Staffing of the department should be accomplished using mutual aid as the funeral services draw nearer.

 

Fire service funerals are set in deep tradition, but it is important to remember that the wishes of the fallen’s family come first, followed by the fire department and then by the community. Do not force any firefighter traditions onto the family. A detailed explanation of the service protocols may be necessary. The family needs to know and understand that a firefighter funeral is non-traditional when compared to civilian funeral services. Keep everyone informed. Plan in advance for facilities that will accommodate a large crowd. Consider using a civic center, gymnasium, stadium or large church. Contact honor guards as soon as a firefighter funeral has been decided.

 

Returning to normal operations should be done as soon as possible. Most firefighters want to reclaim their territory-i.e. firehouse-as soon as they can. Let them get back to their routine.

 

Memorial funds will need to be established soon after the incident. Contact your local bank and a tax specialist to determine what is best when establishing the fund.

 

It is my sincerest hope that you never experience the loss of a fellow firefighter, but if you do, then the steps that I have outlined here will hopefully lessen the impact of the unknowns.

 

Post Script

By now, many of you are probably wondering where I would get such a detailed plan. It came from a discussion group that was lead by Chief Mark Wessels of Keokuk, Iowa and held last year in East Peoria.

 

On the morning of December 22, 1999 and just two weeks after Worcester, MA lost six firefighters in a warehouse fire, Chief Wessels lost three of his own, including his assistant chief who was also his best friend, to a structural fire that also claimed the lives of three children. The structure flashed over, causing the deaths of the three firefighters. The firefighters had removed two children and were going back for the third child when the flashover occurred.

 

At the memorial service held at the high school gymnasium, I was struck by the composure of Chief Wessels as he eulogized his three men. He did so with the widows and children of the fallen heroes sitting directly in front of him. I was so moved by his strength under such extraordinary circumstances that I came home and wrote him a letter.

 

When I saw him last year, he spoke very openly of the whole experience; from the time the call came in until the final reports were issued. He described the five steps of grieving that he and his entire department went through. He talked about his clash with his city’s mayor. He discussed the relentless investigation by the Iowa Occupational Safety and Health Administration. During the entire time, he also had a fire department to run; a department that was very short of manpower. He described the anger of some citizens who were upset because “firefighters took over their town and their memorial service”. He had to appease some national organizations that felt “slighted” at the funeral. He relived the day and the anger over manpower constraints. On the day of the incident, the department had to split their resources for a MVA and minutes later, the house fire.

 

His fire department, though grateful for all of the help, was now growing angry from what they felt were “intrusions”. It was then that Chief Wessels knew that it was time to thank everyone for their help and to send them on their way.

 

At the end of our discussion, I had a question that was weighing very heavily upon me. So I asked him.

 

“How many did you lose off of your department after this horrific chain of events?”

 

He looked at me with a grin and said “Not one!”

 

And that is a testament to the strength and the spirit of the Brotherhood!

 

Take care and stay safe.

 

The article as submitted is published under The Adventures of Jake and Vinnie© umbrella and is the intellectual property of Art Goodrich a.k.a. xchief22 and ChiefReason. It is protected by federal copyright laws and cannot be re-printed in any form without expressed permission from the author.

How Can They Learn If We Keep Killing Them?

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First Published 5/26/03

 

I have just read the tragic story of yet another LODD of a very young, future firefighter from Newcastle, Wyoming. Andee Huber, 16, a high school sophomore, died from injuries that she received when the tanker truck that she was a passenger in, left the roadway and rolled over. She was ejected from the vehicle and was pronounced dead from her injuries at the hospital. She was active in track and swimming and was in the Explorer’s program, training to become a firefighter. She is survived by her parents, a sister and two brothers-one that recently returned from Operation Iraqi Freedom.

 

The driver of the tanker, Ron Caillier, 46, was treated for cuts and abrasions.

 

The Wyoming Highway Patrol reported that neither occupant of the tanker were wearing seat belts and were both ejected from the vehicle.

 

Caillier was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol and was being held without bond as of Friday (5/23) morning.

 

I read the news account of this tragedy and I started going over in my mind a number of topics that many of us have discussed in public forums that would appear to be central to this latest tragedy:

§         Wearing seat belts when responding

§         What is a safe speed when driving apparatus

§         Allowing juniors/explorers to respond to calls on apparatus

§         Setting a good example for young firefighters’

§         Drinking, then responding to calls

 

Those topics immediately came to mind and I am sure that there are others, but it was as if I had been struck by déjà vu.

 

With the exception of a policy of allowing juniors/explorers to respond to calls on apparatus, the other topics that I mentioned that were factors in this fatal incident can be attributed to one act of bad judgment on the part of the driver-drinking, then responding.

I know that some of you are sitting there and are thinking that a person is innocent until proven guilty and I agree, in principle. BUT, the headline read:

 

Teen Firefighter Killed In Tanker Truck Rollover: Driver Charged With DUI.

 

It now becomes a case of “guilty until proven innocent” because a public servant is involved. I will say that the Wyoming Highway Patrol believed strongly enough that alcohol was a factor in this case to charge the driver. That means that field sobriety, breathalyzer (or a refusal of same) and interviews of the driver at the time of the incident determined that charges should be filed.

 

Was the driver’s judgment impaired? Did it play a role with him not wearing his seat belt or in telling his passenger to do the same? Or was such a blatant disregard for safety the department’s SOP?

 

Did impairment by alcohol play a role in the safe operation of the tanker apparatus or did this driver typically push the bounds of safety and with the knowledge of the department’s hierarchy? We’ve all heard it before: I’ve only had a couple. I’m OK.

Was the driver’s decision to respond to the call at all impaired by the effects of alcohol? I sober up as soon as I hear the tones drop. You KNOW it happens!

 

One of our IACOJ members recently wrote an articulate and passionate piece for our website about OUR responsibilities to the future firefighters. Our roles as teachers must include not only giving examples, but setting them as well! We must be vigilant enough to recognize whether our “students” are learning the subject matter. If we are going to take the time and effort to establish a role for juniors/explorers in our fire organizations, then we’d better damn well create a system of checks and balances.

 

Otherwise, “teachers” and “students” alike will continue to die! It must stop and WE must stop it! We must make certain that what we do has value in our learning process and is effectively communicated to everyone.

 

If we have members who respond for departments that “fly by the seat of their pants”, then we must protect them from potential harm. We have to take the lead or there is no good reason to have an organization with the wealth of knowledge that our organization possesses. Protecting the safety of our firefighters and EMS personnel should be the core of our mission-absolutely. It should be shared freely and should not be a commodity that is sold for $23.95 a month!

 

In closing, I’d like to share a few more thoughts.

 

The founder and publisher of a prominent fire service magazine attempted to draw comparisons of this recent, tragic event to the Lairdsville incident of two years ago. I found his assertions to be ridiculous and here’s why:

 

If Ron Caillier did, in fact, consume alcohol to a level of intoxication and that contributed to the death of Andee Huber, then he will most likely be tried for driving under the influence and either a criminally negligent or reckless homicide charge. That will be decided by the state’s attorney. Regardless, it is a case of bad judgment on Caillier’s part.

 

Alan Baird III was consumed by arrogance and stupidity and is a case of bad decision-making that contributed to the death of a firefighter.

 

The only common thread that joins these two cases is that two very young firefighters died.

 

Both are tragic and both were 100% AVOIDABLE.

 

Take care and be safe above all else.

 

The article as submitted is published under The Adventures of Jake and Vinnie© umbrella and is the intellectual property of Art Goodrich a.k.a. xchief22 and ChiefReason. It is protected by federal copyright laws and cannot be re-printed in any form without expressed permission from the author.

Baptism By Fire Or Death By Diversity?

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We use the term “baptism by fire” in the fire service to measure that milestone that we achieve with our first big fire; our first true test as a firefighter. The “baptism” welcomes us into a world where ranks are closed very tightly and bonds are never to be broken. And when one dies, the aggrieved mourns the loss, but it is the fire department that captures all of the attention.

 

This blog is done with respect to and in honor of Fire Paramedic Apprentice (FPA) Rachel Wilson of the Baltimore City Fire Department, who died during a training exercise on February 9, 2007.

 

The intent of this blog is to examine pre-incident issues, post-incident issues, recommendations that were made post-incident and corrective measures taken to date. Comments are welcome, but they will be respectful, thoughtful and most of all, civil. I expect there to be differences of opinions, but again; they will be respectful replies.

 

Because of the many issues involved, I believe that it is important that a dissection of available information takes place and we intake them as lessons learned.

 

First of all, I know very little about the “inner” workings of one of our storied fire departments in this country; Balitmore City Fire Department. After all, they were the backdrop for the feature film “Ladder 49”.

 

However; though I may not know how BCFD fulfills their mission statement, I know how it should work at ANY fire department, because firefighters are NOT supposed to die during their training. They are supposed to be learning the skills that will keep them alive!

 

I will tell you that, based on the information circulated after the death of FPA Rachel Wilson and since, it appears that this tragic incident has become a political football and though inappropriate, it is the exclamation point to a series of decisions that may have been made for the wrong reasons that culminated in the death of a 29 year old mother of two small children.

 

After I read the NIOSH report for this LODD, I was reminded of a training death that occurred on September 25, 2001. Bradley Golden died during a training exercise in Lairdsville, NY.

 

I was reminded because, in my opinion in both cases, leadership failed. Those who were charged with protecting these new probationary firefighters, failed to do so. Make no mistake; that “protection” begins from the selection process through the rest of their tenure with the fire department.

 

They are similar incidents because, in both cases, national standards that could have protected them were either violated or ignored. They certainly were not followed. As an example; in both cases, more than ONE fire was set and materials containing petro-chemical components were used as fuel for the training fires.

 

The other, obvious similarity between the two was that; post-incident, no one was willing to accept responsibility for their actions/inactions. Baltimore Mayor Dixon wasn’t accepting responsibility for Rachel Wilson’s death, even though she pushed for diversity for city employees.

 

BCFD Chief Goodwin fired three officers because he wasn’t accepting responsibility for Wilson’s training death, even though it was his personal pick heading up the training academy.

 

In the Lairdsville, NY case, at least the person who refused to take responsibility for his actions was arrested, charged, tried and convicted of contributing to the death of Bradley Golden.

 

FPA Rachel Wilson was described in the NIOSH report as a 29 year old female, who stood 5’ 4” tall and weighed 192 pounds. According to the CDC Body Mass Index Calculator, Wilson’s BMI was 33; considered to be “obese”. A weight of 110 – 140 pounds for that height would produce a “normal” range BMI stat. This could have been a factor with Wilson’s inability to self-evacuate through a window with a 41” high sill.

 

Furthermore, there were accusations made early on in the investigation that diversity was a key consideration in Wilson’s hiring. In addition, at the time of FPA Wilson’s training death, the fire department did not have any physical fitness requirements. In other words, NO CPAT (Candidate Physical Ability Test)!

 

During the post-incident investigation, all fire department officers interviewed, stated that the “city had removed physical fitness requirements” some years before, in an “attempt to recruit a more diversified work force”. The fire department had a physical agility test that lacked national consensus and it relied on “self-elimination” of candidates. The environment at the fire academy was to pressure the less qualified recruits to drop out,” according to interviews.

 

So; if a candidate made a poor decision to apply, what are the chances that they will make the decision to “self-eliminate”? It is common during the agility portion of a CPAT certified course to FAIL. This tells that applicant: (a) better luck next time and (b) go get into better physical shape and come back. BUT; you don’t get hired until you can pass and damn the diversity initiatives, because being fit for the job has NOTHING to do with race, gender or religion.

 

Without knowing BCFD’s complete testing process, reports stated that FPA Wilson experienced “mask claustrophobia” during previous training evolutions. Additionally, Wilson had not met the minimum time of the physical agility test. It was reported that Wilson tested again just prior to the live burn and produced a slower time than her initial test time.

 

So; it is clear that FPA Rachel Wilson’s firefighter skill sets were being brought into question, but only after her death.

 

Reports were saying that certified fire instructors in Maryland were in short supply. Plus, it was costly to schedule and hire them for training, so, under the watchful eye of Chief Goodwin, the fire department was going to save money by hiring “adjunct” instructors and pay them with more time off, which simply means that he was going to use HIS people and instead of paying them overtime, they would be given more Kelly days. But, wouldn’t someone have to cover them in the rotation and wouldn’t they be paid overtime to do it?

 

It was reported that, on the day of Wilson’s death, none of the adjunct instructors participating had any training as a fire instructor. Also reported was that the adjunct instructor in FPA Wilson’s squad was doing so for the FIRST time.

 

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is a very important component to personal safety and especially to a firefighter. Turnout gear is literally their barrier to extreme heat and death. According to reports, turnout gear was replaced on the “front lines” and the throwaways were taken to the fire academy, where cadets would select their “gear” for training. On February 9, 2007, FPA Wilson was wearing a coat that was 5 years old and was dirty, but within compliance. Her pants, on the other hand, were 10 years old and well past their useful life and beyond repair. The crotch area shows extreme wear and tear and it was reported that the moisture barrier was no longer effective.

 

Radios, flashlights and SCBAs were provided on an “as needed” basis. Through interviews, it was noted that some of the participants did not have Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) devices and some instructors did not have radios.

 

One could suppose that poor communication caused NINE (9) fires to be set, with seven (7) of those fires set underneath the “fire floor”; in this case, the third floor, where Wilson’s crew was to extinguish a training fire (s).

 

For the training fires, according to NIOSH, a mixture of excelsior, wooden pallets, tree branches, an automotive tire, bed mattresses and foam rubber from a chair were used. Anyone with even a tacit knowledge of NFPA 1403 knows that you only use material with “known burn characteristics”.

The fires were arranged in “teepee” and “lean-to” fashion, both acceptable; however, stuffing excelsior into voids and vent areas are not.

 

Reports (NIOSH) state that FPA Wilson had difficulty controlling the hose line. As the fire that stood in their way on the second floor grew, her instructor took the hose, knocked down the fire on the second floor and then they advanced to the top floor, where conditions soon deteriorated.

 

Their exit was a window that led to a second story roof top. The window was approximately 28” wide and the window sill was 41” from the floor (see report). FPA Wilson could not self-evacuate through the window with the rest of her crew. It took a valiant effort for crews to push through the second floor and up to the third floor in order to assist with the rescue of FPA Wilson. She was in serious condition, quickly transported to the hospital, where she was pronounced dead from her injuries.

 

Mayor Dixon expressed outrage in a press release. Chief Goodwin stated that, if policies were violated, people would be held responsible. His recommendations were sent to the mayor for her press release.

 

An interesting termination occurred with the officer who was in charge of RIT. According to reports, the RIT officer was on “light duty” and could not actively participate. Had NFPA 1403 been followed, the likelihood of activating the team would have been highly unlikely.

 

On the day of the incident and during the press conference afterwards, Chief Goodwin praised everyone involved for their “valiant efforts” to rescue FPA Rachel Wilson. So; why would the officer in charge of RIT be one of the three terminated from the department? How was this reward for a “valiant effort”?

 

Why would anyone on “light duty” be involved beyond the planning stage of a live burn exercise? Who made the decision to place a person on light duty at the scene of a live burn and be put in charge of RIT?

 

Who made the decision to use this three story, dilapidated piece of crap as a live burn training exercise?

 

Who made the decision to set more than one training fire at a time during the training evolution?

 

Who allowed materials with known petro-chemical properties to be used as fuel for the training exercise?

 

And at the very beginning that led to a very sad ending: who made the decision to hire FPA Rachel Wilson?

 

Was the decision to hire Rachel Wilson made by city hall to achieve diversity? If so, then the mayor should be held accountable.

 

If Chief Goodwin allowed the culture that ultimately led to the death of Rachel Wilson, then he needed to be held accountable.

 

Who was accountable for Rachel Wilson on the day she was hired and on the day that she died?

 

How can the fire service be the face of compassion, if we show little, if any for our own? It becomes increasingly harder to save lives if we kill the ones hired to do that.

 

And at the end, there is a hypocrisy that allows for a middle aged, out of shape, paperweight to decree CPAT for everyone…else!

 

That same hypocrisy allows us to spin our information. I applaud BCFD for implementing the corrective actions to the ten (10) NIOSH recommendations. Note that I didn’t say “changes” as Chief Clack did. “Change” is what will occur within the department AFTER the recommendations are implemented.

 

And if anyone is looking for “justice” out of all of this?

 

Let’s just say that there must be a “sliding” scale, because in New York, you can go to jail if you don’t protect your people’s safety, but in Maryland? You just move on to bigger and better things.

 

Here are the links that I promised:

 

http://www.abc2news.com/news/local/story/Final-Report-On-Firefighter-Death-Critical-Of/6LEmfr4uBEWPXYcEKZzQEA.cspx

 

http://www.emsnetwork.org/artman/publish/article_25310.shtml

 

http://www.baltimoresun2.com/talk/showthread.php?t=112618

 

http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200709.html

 

http://wjz.com/topstories/firefighter.injured.west.2.425362.html

 

http://www.baltimorecity.gov/news/press/02-22-07StatementonWilsonInvestigation.pdf

 

http://www.ci.baltimore.md.us/government/fire/downloads/1208/121908%20NIOSH%20Report%202008.pdf

 

http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/healthyweight/assessing/bmi/adult_BMI/english_bmi_calculator/bmi_calculator.htm

 

http://www.citypaper.com/news/story.asp?id=13835

 

http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200138.html

 

http://media.www.loyolagreyhound.com/media/storage/paper665/news/2007/11/20/News/Baltimore.Fire.Chief.Goodwin.Resigns-3111021.shtml

 

http://www.cwhms.com/news.php?id=1

 

http://www.firefighterclosecalls.com/pdf/BaltimoreTrainingLODDFinalReport82307.pdf

 

 

 

 

 

TCSS.

 

 

This article is protected by federal copyright under The Adventures of Jake and Vinnie© umbrella. It cannot be re-produced in any form without the expressed permission of the original author.

Interview with Chief Mark Wessel of Keokuk, IA FD

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Author’s Note: This article first appeared as a “Voice of Reason” article under my pen name ChiefReason in October of 2004 during Fire Prevention Week. I am re-printing it here for several reasons. I do so to honor the memory of Dave McNally, Nathan Tuck and Jason Bitting, the three firefighters who gave the ultimate sacrifice in the performance of their duties. I do so to keep my promise to Chief Wessel to continue to spread his message. And I also want anyone who thinks that they are ready to take the leadership role in their department to read this and then ask themselves if they are ready. I am providing the link to the NIOSH report for those who wish to read a more in-depth account of the events that occurred on December 22, 1999.   http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200004.html

 

On December 22, 2007, it will be eight years ago that Keokuk, IA Fire Department suffered its worst firefighter loss of life to a residential fire.

 

On December 22, 1999, the fire department was decimated by the deaths of Assistant Chief Dave McNally, Firefighter Nathan Tuck and Firefighter Jason Bitting. A young mother lost three of her children. A catastrophe times six!

 

I believe that the lessons learned from this fire are important to future generations, because it is Middle America and occurred in a town with a population of about 13,000. The demographics of this community could mirror many across our nation.

 

Keokuk is protected by a career department consisting of 18 firefighters and a chief. A shift is covered by 5-6 firefighters beginning at 7:00 am with a callback system and mutual aid.

 

I have asked someone who is very close to Mark to introduce this extraordinary gentleman.

 

So I will defer to none other than Chief Billy Goldfeder, founder of www.firefighterclosecalls.com.

 

INTRODUCTION:

 

Chief Mark Wessel is a fire chief like many of us-and like many of us, started off at the bottom rung and worked his way up. He has responded to numerous fires, rescues and related emergencies and has reacted like many of us-from the good to the bad-from the happy to the sad. And like many of us, has tried to do the best he can with what he has to work with-from the budgets to the equipment to the firefighters. Just another hard working fire chief in the USA.

 

Things changed drastically for Chief Wessel and the members of the Keokuk FD in 1999 when not only were 3 children lost in a fire-but 3 of his firefighters as well. The actual story can be found below. My comments are related from a more personal standpoint as far as the “before and after” of when bad stuff, real bad stuff happens.

 

So often in the fire service, we never learn. In some cases, even tragic events don’t change the behaviors of a fire department….even when it happens to them! And that only makes the event more tragic. But in recent times, as horrible as some losses have been, there are some leaders that have tried hard all along-but when the bad occurs, have the guts and leadership to effect change-no matter what the barriers. One such excellent example of that is Chief Mark Wessel. Chief Wessel could have taken many “roads” following this tragic event but that’s not the kind of person he is. It is clear to anyone, once they talk to him, that they will understand that he had the courage to MAKE THE CHANGES and will discuss and share what happened in Keokuk with firefighters anywhere so “that” does not happen to them. Kind of a “history repeating itself” prevention officer. He shares what they did wrong, what they did right and how ANY FD can learn from the horror that he and his firefighters went through. His message is clear-this kind of event does NOT have to happen to you and while yes-he has enacted some very radical changes, Mark’s focus is what all of ours should be everyday-that EVERY FIREFIGHTER RETURNS HOME AFTER EVERY ALARM.

 

It is a pleasure to introduce this interview with my friend and colleague, Chief Mark Wessel.

 

Btn. Chief Billy Goldfeder, E.F.O.

October 2004

 

 

CR: Chief; first of all, thank you for sharing your experiences of this tragic incident. It is a story that I feel needs to be told again and again. The fact that you have traveled this country recounting it is an extraordinary display of humility and strength of character on your part.

 

CW: Thank you, Chief.  This is the only way I can think of that and possibly make something good come out of a very tragic event in our department.

 

CR: I have heard you speak on three occasions. The first time was at the memorial service on Sunday, December 26, 1999. The second time was at Tazewell County Fire School in East Peoria, IL in April of 2002 and just recently in New Windsor, Il on September 16th. And all three times, I sat in awe of your composure. Where do you find the emotional strength to relive that tragic day time after time?

 

CW: Actually, the only way I can describe where the strength comes from is through God and everyone’s prayers.  That day was one of the most, if not the most horrible day of my life.  The loss of our brothers has been horrible to say the least.  The only way I can describe how I am able is simply this: I relive the day in my mind, everyday.  I will never forget the horror for the families, the firefighters, the community, and myself.  All I have left are opportunities to share the experience in hopes someone, somewhere, will be safer.

 

CR: You delivered not one, but three eulogies at the memorial service; all the while, looking at the faces of the families of the three, fallen firefighters. Was it surreal? Were you in a state of shock, denial; what?

How did you do it?

 

CW: To be quite honest, I remember being mostly numb.  I felt so humbled and responsible that all I could think about was the fact that no matter what words were said, they were not adequate.  The entire ordeal was so far above my ability to comprehend, I just existed through the service.  Fortunately, there were so many people that assisted myself, and the department, so that things ran smoothly.  I will never be able to express my gratitude enough to all those people.

 

CR: You did your program at Tazewell on “The Disaster Has Become Personal”. You described the preparation for the memorial, the funeral and arranging for the benefits for the firefighters’ families. You spoke of some battles that you fought during this time. I particularly remember one involving John Buckman, who, I believe, was president of the National Volunteer Fire Council (NFVC) at the time. Can you talk about that?

 

CW: Actually, Chief Buckman was representing the IAFC.  Sometimes people lose perspective of why we were gathered that day.  Politics sometimes supersedes common sense.  Fortunately, it was not a local issue, but more of a national issue as to who would be allowed to sit on the stage (how many union representatives vs. non-union representatives).  Chief Buckman was not the problem.  I was able to mitigate the problem and move forward with the program as planned.  I would like to clarify that I certainly appreciate Chief Buckman traveling to Keokuk to represent the IAFC. That was the first time I had met Chief Buckman, and all I can say is he has been there for my department and me.  I believe we have developed a very good friendship over the past 5 years.   

 

CR: Tell us about the public’s reaction to the overwhelming presence of all of the firefighters at the memorial service.

 

CW: I believe the general public viewed first hand what we mean when we speak of the brotherhood.  The interesting part of the brotherhood in this part of the country is, whether you are paid or volunteer, you belong.  Although the Keokuk Fire Department is all career, and has been for 125 years, when we require assistance, it’s the volunteers that we call on.  I so much appreciate their help for that time and since.

 

CR: Governor Tom Vilsack was in attendance. Were you given any private time with him and can you share with us what was said?

 

CW: There really wasn’t much time.  The Governor traveled here that day, spoke some words of regret and encouragement then returned to Des Moines just after the service. 

 

CR: Assistant Chief Dave McNally and you had a relationship before the two of you joined the fire department. Please tell us about your friend.

 

CW: Dave and I knew each other before we were ever hired onto the department.  We weren’t what you would call running buddies, but occasionally would hang out together.  Dave and I were hired about a year apart.  He more senior to me.  I guess to give a perspective of how our careers evolved, I’ll give a quick and dirty.  Mid 70’s; both firefighters.  Early ’81, Dave became a Lieutenant and I was a firefighter on his shift.  In 1983, I became a Lieutenant and we were on different shifts.  In 1988, I was promoted to Assistant Chief.  Dave was my Lt. In 1995, Dave was appointed Assistant Chief.  In 1997, I was appointed Chief.  Dave was the best.  I would have followed him anywhere.

 

CR: Nathan Tuck was 39 years old at the time, but had only been on the department 4-1/2 years. Did his desire to join come from his other community involvements?

 

CW: I think Nate was all about helping.  It really didn’t matter what he was doing, just so he could help someone.  High school kids seemed to be his passion.  His personality was just right for them.  Nate was so compassionate.  Always encouraging.  That can be an elusive trait to find today.

 

CR: When I see pictures of Jason Bitting, I see youthful exuberance and eyes full of promise. Tell us about Jason.

 

CW: Jason is kind of hard for me.  I think because of the age difference.  A big teddy bear!  So strong, so willing, so intelligent, yet still remaining naïve enough to have a burning desire to live and to learn.  Jason was the kind of person you had to love. 

 

Actually, all three of the guys were so special.  I was able to fill the vacant positions, but could never replace those three special firefighters.

 

CR: Let’s talk about the NIOSH report and especially, the recommendations. Staffing was an issue. It is obvious that your resources were stretched by the MVA and then the report of the residential fire. Is it safe to say that your initial response to the fire was a quint, engine and four personnel. Was this SOP?

 

CW: Yes; that was the initial response.  Whenever you have a total shift of 6 personnel, a 5 man minimum and answer 850 to 900 calls for service a year, you are going to have times when you respond to an emergency with 3, 4, or 5 personnel on the initial response.  This is what we learned:  It’s not how many you respond with, it’s what you do with them when you arrive.  If you lose perspective of the whole picture, it doesn’t matter how many you have.

 

CR: What do you believe NIOSH considered an appropriate staffing level for a city like Keokuk?

 

CW: I think this will also better explain the previous question.  I don’t think NIOSH actually stated how many personnel would be an appropriate staffing level for a community like Keokuk.  If you were to take into consideration NFPA and all of the evolutions that need to be accomplished, I would think that number would be somewhere between 13 and 16 personnel.  Now; that would be for a single-family dwelling.  Next; take into consideration the age and condition of the community.  How about all of the commercial structures in the community?  And, the industrial base that Keokuk serves?  I guess one might easily estimate the need for 24 to 30 personnel on duty ready to respond.  But, the $700 question.  How do we pay for it?  We don’t. We make due with what we can afford.  With that comes responsibility to formulate SOP’s that can be affected safely.  If you can’t do that, then stand back and become defensive in your attack of the emergency.  It’s much easier to stand in front of the media and say we had to let it burn because we did not have the resources to use a reasonable amount of safety to protect the firefighters than it is to conduct a memorial service.  It’s much easier to look at a reporter with rubble in the background than to look into the faces of the grieving family of a firefighter.  That I can say with certainty, and anyone reading this should take it to the bank.

 

CR: The report recommended that the IC does initial size-up before initiating firefighting efforts and then continually evaluating risk versus gain as the incident continues. AC McNally was the highest rank initially. Wouldn’t he have done a size-up before starting search-and-rescue? And would you not take command once on scene under “normal” circumstances?

 

CW: Under normal circumstances, yes.  TUNNEL VISION played a huge role in the way that fire was approached.  Mother, with a 4 year old in hand, screaming, “MY BABIES ARE INSIDE” was key to the deviation from normal operations.  I believe being keyed up from the MVA that morning just prior to the call-in fact they were called off of that incident to this one-played a part in the initial operation.  Having no medical transport available played a key role.  One might say that this fire was routine.  ROUTINE is no longer a word in our vocabulary.  Other than pulling into the fire scene and seeing smoke from a residential structure, there was nothing else routine about it.  There was nothing normal about that day.

 

CR: Do you think too much emphasis or not enough is put on an ICS? What would it have done for you on this day? You had to get the kids out. In retrospect, break the incident down to what might have been done differently.

 

CW: I truly feel ICS is the most important aspect of firefighter safety we can have on the emergency scene.  Good command should reflect control, coordination, goals and communication.  I guess I could beat myself up indefinitely over the operation.  Some may even say I should.  Trust me; I have.  Through this I have gained nothing.  What has been most effective is dissecting the incident into pieces small enough to calculate.  Also, dissecting the department so that the task is not so overwhelming in the development of good SOP’s, SOG’s. 

 

CR: “Defensive search” was mentioned. I don’t mind telling you that it put a silly look on my face. The only thing that I could think that it meant was to take a long stick and poke it through a window and maybe someone would grab it. How close am I?

 

CW: Actually Chief, you’re not to far off.  What defensive search actually refers to is the idea of not over committing.  Do not place yourself in a position that you might become part of the problem.  I know we train to rescue people.  I know we all have learned the right hand rule and left hand rule on primary search and rescue.  Let me just say this:  If you have firefighters who have not had this training, they should not be your rescue team.  If you are a firefighter who has not had this training, then you should refuse to perform interior search and rescue.  I was teaching a basic breathing apparatus class and was asked the question about CEU’s for HAZMAT Tech.  I asked if the student was a Tech and he replied “yes”.  This particular student had never worn breathing apparatus.  Maybe over the years things have changed that much, but I always thought you needed to wear breathing apparatus to train to the HAZMAT Tech level.  Don’t put yourself or your people in an over committed environment.  When and if other resources arrive, then and only then might you consider further commitment?  Stay next to a door or window to do your search.  Do not commit further than your resources or training allow for a reasonable amount of safety.

 

CR: “maintains close accountability for all personnel at the fire scene”. This would suggest that you didn’t know where your FIVE people were, when it is painfully clear that you knew exactly where they were and what they were doing. Was this meant to address communications issues? Who had radios that day?

 

CW: I did in fact know that they were performing rescue operations on the interior of the structure.  When you have this few personnel on the scene, you can track everyone without too many problems.  As the incident grows, you must then utilize a formal accountability system to track all the operations that are simultaneously occurring.  Having a good accountability of your personnel will help to stabilize a scene, reduce freelancing and provide a safer more proficient operation.  Having an established accountability program will reduce the impact of Murphy’s Law.

 

CR: NIOSH addressed communications. Were there difficulties with radio transmissions, radio equipment, and no back-up channels? What caused your radios to be a focus for their review?

 

CW: At the time of this fire, only the officers had portable radios.  Today, all personnel carry radios.  There was very little communications occurring at the scene that morning.  In fact, it would be reasonable to say little or none, except for initial communications with dispatch.  I think NIOSH focused on this mainly because communications seems to be a common denominator in LODD’s.  It would seem to me that whenever a team is focused on search for a known victim, the radio’s become very quiet.  We have worked on our communications quite a lot.  We continue to have a long way to go.  With radio communications there is always room for improvement.  I think for me the lesson in emergency scene communications was not what was communicated but more of what was not communicated.

 

CR: RIT is a biggie. A lot of discussion over the years. At what point in this incident did you actually have enough manpower to assign RIT? And honestly? Knowing Iowa OSHA like I do, I would have bet on a citation for violating two in/two out. Was RIT part of the equation early into this incident?

 

CW: No, RIT really wasn’t a consideration.  Actually the 2 in 2 out rule is negated in Iowa if a known rescue is in progress.  2 in 2 out never played a role in any of the investigation.  My only observation towards 2 in 2 out is; Why is it OK in OSHA’s eyes to perform a rescue with only one person if you know someone is trapped than it is if you are assuming someone may be trapped?  I thought OSHA was about employee safety.  If that is the case, even they make an exception to the rules (SOP’s).

 

CR: The last NIOSH recommendation addresses PASS devices. Your firefighters each wore two; one integrated into the SCBA and the other attached to their coats. Yet, no one could recall hearing any audible alarms from any of the stricken firefighters. Could it be speculated that a thermal event inside the structure rendered the devices inoperable?

 

CW: The third party testing revealed that, due to the extreme thermal event, the electronics failed in all the audible devices.  One more lesson; if it is man made, it can and most probably will fail at the worst time. 

 

CR: Could you talk about relationships and their importance when dealing with a traumatic event?

 

CW: Considering I’ve been fortunate to have not had prior experience with a LODD, I would say we had to learn how to deal with the trauma.  Fortunately, the firefighters respected each other through the entire ordeal.  There were so many different emotions being experienced, you just had to wonder how the department would make it.   I guess the Good Lord stayed with us through to the end.  Although I’m sure we remain far from the end.  Each person experiences grief in a different way and at different times.  Knowing that you are going to have all these different emotions occurring, you have to stay on top of the game.  We were able to come through this with little animosity and hurt feelings.  It’s all about RESPECT.

 

CR: The last time you and I spoke, you told me about the McNally boys and I saw that gleam in your eye and that smile stretch across your face. Tell our readers about them.

 

CW: All three of our men had kids at home.  Some were rather young and would need to analyze all of this at a later age.  Some were older and could, for as well as can be expected, experience the pain and suffering of the loss of their father immediately.  I really could not relate to them very well as I had never experienced a loss of this type.  All I could do is sit back and pray that the children could rationalize the loss and continue to move forward.  Fortunately, to the best of my knowledge, all has gone well.  As for the McNally boys; they are doing well.  Pat, the oldest son of Dave, was in college working towards a degree in law enforcement.  He wised up, changed his mind and moved towards an education in fire science.  Pat decided he wanted to be a firefighter.  Of course, I was pleased with his decision.  Any father would be excited about his son or daughter following in his footsteps.  The difference is, Pat had experienced the worst of times.  Then Pat came to my office and said he wanted to be a firefighter in Keokuk.  Well, you can imagine the mixed emotions I had.  We talked quite extensively regarding the reasons he wanted to be a firefighter.  Pat had the right answers, the right attitude.  Pat has been with the department for over a year now, and is doing very well.  I just see so much of his father in him, sometimes he’ll do something or the look on his face will remind me of Dave, and I have to walk away.  Usually with tears moving down my cheeks.  Pat’s desire to be a firefighter in Keokuk also in some way makes me feel very good inside.  Dave’s youngest son has also expressed an interest in the fire service, and he too would like to be a firefighter in Keokuk.  I only hope I have the opportunity to make that a reality for him also. 

 

CR: That is a fitting ending to this interview, but your story of that day will continue, won’t it? You have such a passion for this that I can tell that you never want anyone else, be it firefighter, family or friend to have to experience it. Your final thoughts, please, Mark.

 

CW: As it is written in Job, “Should we accept the good that is given and not accept the bad?”  Life sometimes throws a curve and we take it on the chin.  I knew even as a firefighter I had a responsibility to others.  My partner was relying on me for his safety.  Then as I was promoted, others were relying on me as well.  Eventually the department became my responsibility, and things went bad.  I had always thought that I operated safely. 

 

Sometimes your eyes get opened unexpectedly.  You don’t have to experience what Keokuk experienced.  Why is it, we all know if we are punched in the nose, it is going to hurt like hell?  Yet some of us still have to pick a fight to believe it. Let Keokuk be your punch in the nose.  Let our incident be your incident.  Study it.  Pick it apart.  Plug it into your operating procedures.  Not just what is written, but how you actually operate on the scene.  For most, you will probably find there are some major discrepancies in your written procedures and your everyday, take it for granted, on scene operations.  You have the ability to “Make The Changes”.  Do you have the desire?  If not let someone else lead.  From the bottom to the top, you must be willing to step forward.  Not stand back, not stand still.  This is not a social club.  If you think it is, ask your family if the social pleasure is worth the risk?  If you are not willing to train, then get out.  Fishing is much more relaxing, but learn to swim first. 

 

Many people have touched my life and supported my department and me through this tragedy.  I can only say “Thank You” to all of them.  To the Firefighters of Keokuk, my hat is off to them.  They exemplify the definition of firefighter.  They have supported me through this, when often lines are drawn in the sand. 

 

As long as my mind, body and soul can summon the strength, I will continue to carry the message of firefighter safety.  Listen to my pain and understand how important it is for “Everyone to go Home”.  Keep that thought in the forefront of all you do.  Do not buckle to the pressures of peers or politicians.  If you can do this, you may just find yourself sleeping better at night.  Stay Safe.

 

First published 10/05/04

 

An Interview With Chief Mark Wessel of Keokuk, IA FD is the intellectual property of Art Goodrich a.k.a. xchief22 and is protected by copyright. It cannot be re-printed in any form without expressed permission of the author.

When Is It The Right Time To Ask Why?

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First Published 11/10/08

 

The reason that I ask is because the “why” always leads to the “how”.

 

Firefighter Killed While Working At A Vehicle Accident Scene.

Why was he/she killed? What was he/she doing at the time? How did it happen?

 

Firefighter Dies After Returning To The Station.

Why did he/she die? What was he/she doing at the time? How did it happen?

 

Firefighter Dies At A Structural Fire.

Why did he/she die? What was he/she doing when they died? Where was he/she when he/she died? How did it happen?

 

Firefighter Dies At Fire Due To Equipment Malfunction.

Why was there an equipment failure that killed the firefighter? What equipment failed, causing the death? How could that happen?

 

You look at the “headline” and the questions that I pose are reasonable and in my mind, are but a few of the many questions that will come post incident.

 

Why?

 

Because a firefighter died. The “why” always leads to “how”.

 

Take my first headline and break it down. The firefighter, based upon news reports, was struck by a vehicle who failed to slow down and move to the farthest lane. That answers the “why”. According to reports, the firefighter was returning from the apparatus with a tool when he was struck and killed. That answers the “what”.

 

The “how” is the question that gets most of the emotionally-charged attention and debate. Those who were at the scene or who are close to the department are immediately and irrevocably devastated by the death of their loved one. They are angered by the senselessness of it. They were there to help. Though risk is a part of the job description, DYING is not!

 

This death of one of their own is very personal. At this time, the only question that matters is how are we going to get through this?

 

The only information to be shared is the details of the memorial and funeral. This isn’t “school” and “lessons learned” will have to wait.

 

Emotions have paralyzed a department that, just a few moments earlier was whole and robust.

 

The fire academy graduation picture of the fallen firefighter is sent out across the nation. To his comrades-his grieving brothers and sisters-it is the face of their fire department. It is the face of honor, bravery, commitment, integrity and compassion. Those qualities ARE the firefighter and they resonate through the department and cannot be separated one from the other, even through death. He defines the fire department and the fire department defines him; locked together by decades of those who came before him and tempered by the finest of traditions.

 

And what about the rest of the nation’s fire service; the brothers and sisters, who on any given day, could die serving their fellow Man?

 

They must find a way to make some sense of it, to come to grips with their own mortality, to offer solace to the aggrieved and when the time is right, to ask “why”.

 

When the “why” is asked, which leads to the “how”, I ask, not because I speculate that someone did something wrong; I ask because I don’t want to do something wrong.

 

Questions are asked out of our selfish need to know, but it is incumbent upon leaders to study fatality reports to add anything that they can learn from it to strengthen their decision-making.

 

I firmly believe that sound decisions-right decisions-can be made and yet, have a wrong outcome. Firefighters must make their decisions based upon their knowledge through training and experience within seconds of conditions that can change within seconds and do so with the conviction and belief that everyone goes home.

 

A firefighter will fight fire with the strength of a hundred men, because they know that it will become a destructive and hateful monster that will grow and consume everything in its path. It will leave booby traps that will collapse upon you, gain strength from whatever it consumes, generate more energy and KILL, unless we kill it first.

 

It will hide under its cloak of smoke, will inhale a small breath of air and explode into a fiery fury to destroy, were it not for the firefighters standing between it and its quest.

 

It has been written that the fire service has a romance with Fire; that we speak to it with a certain romanticism. Fire has been the object of worship. Some will light a fire in the fireplace to “set a mood”. Others will sit around a fire and tell stories or sing songs, mesmerized by its almost hypnotic powers.

 

But firefighters see its ugly underbelly, its aftermath of destruction and death. There is nothing “romantic” about that. There is only hate; a hate that is manifest from the misery, pain, suffering, sadness, sorrow and fear that a fire causes.

 

I hate it for another reason.

 

I hate it because it leaves me to ask “why”, which always leads to the “how”.

 

Yet, I’ll never know when it is the right time to ask.

 

I only know that the questions will be asked as long as proven leaders-leaders who lead from the front-and firefighters with promising careers that will never be-continue to die.

 

God bless them.

 

God, please protect us.

 

TCSS.

 

 

The article as submitted is published under The Adventures of Jake and Vinnie© umbrella and is the intellectual property of Art Goodrich a.k.a. xchief22 and ChiefReason. It is protected by federal copyright laws and cannot be re-printed in any form without expressed permission from the author.

A Forgettable 2007?©

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 First Published 1/5/08

2007 is but a kaleidoscope of memories, many of them less than noteworthy. At my age and with my busy lifestyle, memories aren’t memories at all; they are momentary events that are enjoyed, and then stored under its proper “short term tab”.

 

However, as unremarkable as my meager existence is, there is information from 2007 that IS worth remembering and taking it with us as we advance upon 2008.

 

LODDs for 2007 totaled 115! No better and no worse than in previous years; 2001 being the exception. Why? Why? Why?

 

Is it any surprise that heart attacks still account for HALF of all firefighter fatalities? Are the biscuit eaters still making fun of the bagel eaters? Are you spending more money for “custom” sizes of turnout gear? Still believe that cooling fans at the scene are “silly”? How about pre-employment physicals and yearly physicals thereafter as a way to identify potential problems with strenuous activities? Many of you still lifting weights “12 ounces at a time”? Workouts just for gym rats and the vain?

 

While we work the muscles around our mouths, firefighters are dropping dead from undetected, congenital cardiac problems. Firefighters are dying because they plug up their arteries with fat, sugars, cholesterols and nicotine. Firefighters are getting a firefighter’s funeral because they are over exerting themselves at the scene and then suffering a fatal cardiac event shortly thereafter. In 2007, 55 firefighters DIED from “stress/over-exertion”. That’s 47.8% of all 2007 fatalities.

 

When we discuss the 16 Life Safety Initiatives, health and wellness HAS to become a bigger part of the emphasis programs going forward. We have to recognize the physical demands of firefighting and stop taking those who cannot pass the agility tests or who can no longer perform them due to other factors.

 

RESPONDING to scenes is a hot topic on just about every firefighter website that I frequent. Let’s see, where is that…

Ah; here it is. 26 Firefighters died while RESPONDING to the call due to a vehicle collision. In other words, 26 firefighters didn’t make it to the call! They BECAME the call. Talk about apparatus color, lights, sirens, wig wags and blue mega flashers for your POVs all that you want, but it all comes down to DRIVING; your’s and the motoring public’s. If WE are driving with DUE REGARD, it will NEVER be our fault. We should NOT be killing ourselves getting to a scene.

 

Another interesting stat is that in all, 70 firefighters were NOT on scene when they died for one reason or another. 61% of all fatalities occurred away from the incident scene. That says that they didn’t make it to the scene or died after clearing the scene. And the information indicates that there were a few pre-incident fatal heart attacks suffered as well.

 

We address the issue of age a lot, in terms of attitude, physical shape, maturity level, knowledge, experience and motivation among others. Here are the fatalities by age groups: (5) under the age of 21; (6) ages 21 – 25; (9) ages 26 – 30; (26) ages 31 – 40; (31) ages 41 – 50; (21) ages 51 – 60; and (16) age 61 and over.

Are some of you as surprised as I am? We thought it was the “younguns” driving like maniacs, didn’t we? Well, even if you take everyone up to the age of 30, that’s only 20 and we KNOW that not all the deaths under the age of 30 were due to vehicle collisions, so I would want to see empirical data on the breakdown of age groups when reviewing vehicle collisions. Just as I struggle with firefighters under the age of 30 suffering heart attacks, I also struggle with the idea that older, mature adults can’t keep their focus and operate vehicles in a safe and sane manner all the time.

 

The report that I read had excellent information. If you want to review it in more detail, go to USFA website and look up the U.S. Fire Administration Firefighter Fatality Provisional 2007 Report.  

 

A forgettable 2007? Hardly.

 

Remember it. Take it with you.

 

Everyday.

  

The article as submitted is published under The Adventures of Jake and Vinnie© umbrella and is the intellectual property of Art Goodrich a.k.a. xchief22 and ChiefReason. It is protected by federal copyright laws and cannot be re-printed in any form without expressed permission from the author.